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NOTE

The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal:
The Compatibility of Peace, Politics,
and International Law
ABSTRACT
Since 1991, a brutal war has raged among ethnic groups
of the former Yugoslavia. Outragedby the atrocitiesthat have
pervaded the war, the United Nations established an
international tribunal in 1993 to adjudicate violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the Yugoslav
conflict. Although well-intentioned, the Yugoslav Tribunal
nevertheless may fail to accomplish its goals. A number of
practical and legal obstacles may impede its success. In
particular,the United Nations lack of physical control over the
combatants in the Yugoslav conflict may frustrate the
Tribunal's ability to bring accused war criminals to justice.
This Note surveys the problems that the Yugoslav Tribunal
may encounter in attempting to prosecute violations of
international humanitarian law. It examines the successes
and failures of past war crimes tribunals and analyzes the
integrity of the law the Yugoslav Tribunal will apply. This
Note concludes that even if the Yugoslav Tribunalfails in its
immediate goal of prosecuting war criminals, it may
nevertheless expedite a peaceful resolution to the conflict and
strengthenthe stature of internationalhumanitarianlaw.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .........................................................

120

II.

A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF THE BREAK-Up OF
YUGOSLAVIA ............................................................

125

120

III.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 28:119
TWENTIETH CENTURY EXPERIENCE WITH WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS ..............................................................
World War I ................................................
World War 1f ...............................................
THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE YUGOSLAV TRIBUNAL..
UN Security Council Actions Leading to
A.
Resolution 827 ...........................................
The Structure, Procedures,and Territorial
B.
Jurisdictionof the Tribunal..........................
Territorial Jurisdiction and
1.
Structure of the Tribunal .................
Procedures of the Tribunal ..............
2.
Subject MatterJurisdictionof the Tribunal....
C.
HARD CHOICES: THE AGENDA FOR PEACE,
PEACEKEEPING, AND PEACEMAKING .............................

132
140
147

CONCLUSION ...........................................................

170

POSTSCRIPT .............................................................

172

A.
B.

IV.

V.
VI.

130

148
150
151
153
155

164

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite attempts by the European Community and the
United Nations to mediate a peaceful, diplomatic settlement,' an
ethnic war has raged in the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY) since June 1991.2 This war has forced the
United Nations to take the extraordinary step of convening a war
crimes tribunal, the first of its kind since the end of World War II.
In 1993, the United Nations established the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 3 (Yugoslav Tribunal or
atrocities, such as the Serbian policy of
Tribunal) to adjudicate
"ethnic cleansing,"4 committed in the Yugoslav conflict.

See Amy Lou King, Note, Bosnia-Herzegovina-Vance-OwenAgenda For
1.
A Peaceful Settlement: Did The U.N. Do Too Little, Too Late, To Support This
Endeavor?, 23 GA. J. INr'L & COMP. L. 347, 349 (1993).
Marcus Tanner, Slovenia is at War, INDEPENDENT (London), June 28,
2.
1991, at 1.
At the first session of the Tribunal, held from Nov. 17-30, 1993 at The
3.

Hague, The Netherlands, the Tribunal settled on the official name, "The
International Tribunal for Crimes in Former Yugoslavia." See U.N. Doc. SC/5760
(Dec. 1, 1993).
King, supra note 1, at 348. Ethnic cleansing is a formal domestic
4.
policy of removing "undesirable" minority populations from a given territorial unit

on the basis of religion, ethnicity, political affiliation, or ideology to create

homogeneity in the larger population. Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, A Brief History of
Ethnic Cleansing, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 110. Although all sides have
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The success of the Tribunal bears not only on the credibility
of the United Nations, but also on the legitimacy of international
humanitarian

law.

Although the end of the Cold War has

purportedly spawned a New World Order 5 under which force may
be used as a "servant of justice" to punish human rights

violations, 6 the historical incompatibility of peacemaking and war
crimes prosecution still threatens to jeopardize the United Nations
ability to prosecute such violations. 7 Thus, the establishment of
the Tribunal tests the United Nations political will to bring the
accused before it, as well as the force and effect of international
humanitarian law. 8
Political leaders and legal commentators generally view the
Tribunal with optimism.9 Nevertheless, some critics deem the
Tribunal an empty gesture through which Europe and the United
States hope to assuage their guilt for failing to act when the war
erupted, thereby permitting the carnage that continues to this
Both critics and proponents recognize that, like any
day.10
international jurisprudential body, the Tribunal must overcome
significant practical, political, legal, and technical obstacles1 1 that
United Nations goal of bringing accused war
may eviscerate the 12
justice.
to
criminals

committed serious violations of human rights, the Serbian policy of ethnic
cleansing was the impetus for the establishment of the Tribunal. Christopher C.
Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standardsin the Former Yugoslavia. The Case For
an InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal,22 DENV. J. IN'rLL. & POLY 235, 236 (1994).
At the beginning of the Gulf War, President George Bush commented
5.
that "we have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future
generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the
jungle, governs the conduct of nations." War in the Gulf- The President, Transcript
of the Comments by Bush on the Air Strikes Against the Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 1991, at A14.
Payam Akhavan, Punishing War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: A
6.
CriticalJuncturefor the New World Order, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 262, 289 (1993).
See infrapart V.
7.
Theodor Meron, The Casefor War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN
8.
AFF., Summer 1993, at 122, 126.
See Bill Schiller,
See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 6, at 263-64.
9.
Uncertainty Dogs Start of War Crimes Tribunal TORONTO STAR, Nov. 18, 1993, at
A19.
10.
See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Comment, Peace vs. Accountability in
Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INrT L. 500 (1994); Ian Traynor, War-crimes Court Takes First
Faltering Steps; But Hague Tribunal Is Under-Funded, Under-Staffed and
Confronted by Oppositionin the West, GAZETrE (Montreal), Nov. 19, 1993, at D15.
11.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an InternationalCriminal
Court, 1 IND. INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991).
12.
John Pomfret, War Crimes' Punishment Seen Distant; Balkan Probe
Lacks Funds and Backing, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1993, at A39.
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Since its inception, the Tribunal has encountered practical
problems with obtaining evidence and fimancing.13

In addition,

political disputes among national governments over the
desirability of having a war crimes tribunal have further
threatened the Yugoslav Tribunal's viability. 14 The United States
and the European Community have strongly preferred a political
settlement to the conflict because of its unwillingness to commit
troops to a full-scale military intervention. 1 5 Although a political
settlement without war crimes trials would avoid inevitable
disputes among the leaders of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia over
whose nationals should be subject to war crimes prosecution,
giving up the Tribunal as part of a peace settlement would render
meaningless the goals of international peace and respect for
human dignity set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. 16
The legal and technical obstacles standing before the
Tribunal may be attributable to the United Nations limited role as
a peacekeeping entity. The United Nations has had little direct
military involvement in the Yugoslav conflict, and consequently
lacks control over individuals and documents located in the
SFRY. 1 7 This lack of control and the apparent unwillingness of
the international community to commit military forces to end the
Yugoslav conflict severely undermine the Tribunal's ability to gain
custody of accused war criminals and to obtain the evidence
Is
necessary to prosecute them.
In contrast, the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials after
World War II demonstrate that physical control over the
combatants and the corresponding power to impose criminal
sanctions are essential to the success of a war crimes tribunal. 19
The unconditional surrender of the Axis forces after World War II
prevented bargaining over war crimes trials among the victors
and the defeated nations. Because the alleged war criminals no
longer controlled their governments at the end of the war, they
20
were powerless to challenge the Allies' plans to prosecute them.
History demonstrates that the power to impose justice is crucial
to the successful prosecution of war crimes: It minimizes the
political obstacles that stand in the way of such judicial

R.C. Longworth, Peace vs. Justice: DePaul Professor Fears UN
13.
Sabotaged His InquiryInto Yugoslav War Crimes, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 1994, at 1C.
14.
Id.
See Gary J. Bass, Courting Disaster: The U.N. Goes Soft on Bosnia
15.
Again, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 1993, at 13.
16.
Akhavan, supranote 6, at 283.
See infra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
17.
18.
Id. See also D'Amato, supranote 10, at 501.
19.
See infra part III.B.
20.
Id.
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proceedings and allows the judicial process to proceed
21
unhindered by challenges and delays raised by accused parties.
This Note describes the historical incompatibility between
peacemaking and war crimes prosecution that the UN Security
Council and the Tribunal must overcome to fulfill the United
Nations larger mission of maintaining peace in the post-Cold War
era. 2 2 For example, even supporters of the Yugoslav Tribunal
concede that, despite the Tribunal's relatively sound legal
foundation, the United Nations weak enforcement power will
undermine its ability to gain custody of the accused and the
threat of prosecution will merely trap the accused international
pariahs within the borders of their home states. 23 Pessimists,
looking at the realpolitik of the situation, believe that the United
Nations dual goals in the Yugoslav conflict of achieving a political
settlement and prosecuting war criminals are mutually
incompatible. 2 4 Both sides of the debate recognize that the
potential effectiveness of the Tribunal hinges on the limited power
of the United Nations, which as a neutral third-party has no
physical or political control over the Yugoslav conflict. 25
Irrespective of the Tribunal's success in prosecuting accused
war criminals, the Tribunal is important to the future growth and
acceptance of international humanitarian law because "law
develops out of a dynamic where historical opportunity provides
the occasion for evolving a new sort of legal understanding and
development that can then provide a more settled foundation for

See Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an InternationalCriminal Court,
21.
supra note 11, at 2-5 (providing examples of war crimes prosecutions after

battlefield victories). D'Amato argues that after World War II, the defeated Axis
powers were in no position to use the planned war crimes tribunals as a
bargaining chip in negotiating peace with the Allies. D'Amato, supra note 10, at

501.
See Kelly A. Childers, Comment, United Nations PeacekeepingForcesin
22.
the Balkan Wars and the Changing Role of Peacekeeping Forces in the Post-Cold

War World, 8 TEMP. INT'& COMP. L.J. 117, 129-31 (1994).
23.
Meron, supranote 8, at 134.
The Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations, Muhamad Sacirbey,
24.
said the Tribunal is "a way to substitute for real action to confront and stop the
[war] crimes. By constantly telling the world media that the war criminals will be
brought to justice, the most powerful members of the Security Council have tried
to avoid the responsibility of bringing them to justice and putting the crimes to a
stop today.... [Tihe first step in dealing with any crime is to stop it, not to set up
a legal system by which you prosecute it." Muhamad Sacirbey, Remarks, Should
There Be an InternationalTribunal for Crimes Against Humanity, 6 PACE INTr L.

REV. 63, 65 (1994).
Kresimir Pirsl, Remarks, Should There Be an International Tribunalfor
25.
Crimes Against Humanity, 6 PACEIN% L. REV. 69, 70-71 (1994).
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behavior in the future.2 6 Thus, the Tribunal is significant
because its very existence will at the very least facilitate

negotiations toward a peace settlement, promote the protection of
the war crimes
of war through
time
human rights in
2 7
The best
prosecutions, and deter future human rights abuses.

possible result of the Tribunal would be a revival of the principles

of human rights first enunciated at Nuremberg and a rededication
to preventing inhumane acts of injustice during times of
28
conffict.
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of the events
precipitating the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and
describes existing conditions as of November 1, 1994. Part III
analyzes the successes and failures of war crimes trials as tools
Part IV discusses how the Yugoslav
for peace settlements.
Tribunal will function and reviews the law it will apply. Part V
evaluates the role of the UN Security Council in making peace in
the post-Cold War era, and addresses the need for the Security
Council's permanent members to negotiate peace in the former
Yugoslavia, without risking the integrity of the international
This Note concludes that the United
human rights regime.
Nations and the international community as a whole must elevate
the interests of international humanitarian law above their own
respective national interests for the Tribunal to be a viable part of
the peacemaking process in the former Yugoslavia and in the
future.

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Nuremberg: Forty Years Later, in Panel Session:
26.
Forty Years After the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: The Impact of the War
Crimes Trials on Internationaland NationalLaw, 80 AM. SOCV INr L. PROC. 56, 59

(1986).
27.

D'Amato, supra note 10, at 503.

DAmato argues that three warring

parties, each of whom committed war crimes, threatened with war crimes trials
have a dual incentive to give concessions in peace negotiations. Id. at 503-04.
One party may be willing to give up territory or other spoils of war if other parties
agree to drop demands for war crimes trials. Id. War crimes thus become a "cost
of war," forcing combatants to give up something that war is expected to grant
them. This forced exchange undermines the argument that war crimes are a
military necessity, as the advantages of committing war crimes will be
relinquished in a final peace settlement Id. at 505-06. This line of reasoning is
especially relevant to the Yugoslav conflict because the Serbs use "ethnic
cleansinge to consolidate their holdings over the very territory they may be forced
to give up in a peace settlement. Therefore, ethnic cleansing loses any political or
military justifications it may have in the mind of the Serbs, and ceases to be a
viable policy for future combatants. See id. But see Joyner, supranote 4, at 272
("It would be wrong to trade away the Tribunal's proceedings in exchange for
Serbian concessions in negotiations for bringing about an end to hostilities.
Resort to brutal, unlawful means to accomplish an unlawful geopolitical end
should not be rewarded by casting aside the institutional means for obtaining just
restitution under international law.").
See Joyner, supranote 4, at 272.
28.
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II. A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was
formed from the rubble of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after
World War J.29
Prior to its dissolution in 1991, the SFRY
consisted of six republics-Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, BosniaHerzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia-and two autonomous
30
regions-Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Political instability and ethnic tension plagued the SFRY from
its inception until Marshall Tito established a communist
government in 1947.31 In 1980, after the death of Tito, tension
among the three major ethnic groups in the SFRY-the Croats,
Bosnian Muslims, and Serbs-resurfaced.3 2 The ethnic unrest
contributed to the decentralization of the federal government as

the more prosperous republics of Croatia and Slovenia objected to
subsidizing the economies of less industrialized republics like
Serbia, while Serbia wanted to retain control over the federal

government to ensure that economic support.33
While the Republic of Serbia consolidated political control
over the remaining republics by the late 1980s, the SFRY's
governing party34-the League of Communists of Yugoslavia-had

29.
See John Webb, Note, Genocide Treaty-Ethnic Cleansing-Substantive
and Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Genocide Convention to Alleged
Crimes in the FormerYugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INr' & COMP. L. 377, 381-86 (1993).
30.
The SFRY had a population of approximately 23.69 million. Marc
Weller, Note, The InternationalResponse to the Dissolutionof the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INt' L. 569 (1992). The new "rump Yugoslavia"
consists of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Kosovo and Vojvodina. Id. at 595.
31.
Webb, supra note 29, at 385.
32.
Tito's strong personality held the country together, and his death
precipitated an economic crisis and increased ethnic tension between Serbs and
Albanians in the province of Kosovo. See Stephen L. Burg, Nationalism and
Democratization in Yugoslavia, WASH. Q., Autumn 1991, at 8. Increasingly,
Croats, Slovenes, and Muslims began to view the Serbs as dominating the SFRY
and attempting to gather all control of the federal government into their hands.
Id.
33.
Webb, supranote 29, at 385 n.41.
34.
The SFRY had been led by a presidential council, the chair of which
rotated among the representatives of the republics and autonomous regions.
Philip J. Cohen, Ending the War and Securing Peace in Former Yugoslavia, 6 PACE
INrTL L. REV. 19, 26 n.19 (1994). Each of the six republics of the SFRY had one
vote within the federal presidency. Id. The two autonomous regions, Kosovo and
Vojvodina, also had one vote each, for a total of eight votes. Id. In 1989, the
Serbs dissolved the legislatures of Kosovo and Vojvodina and gained control of
their votes. Id. With the solid support of Montenegro, Serbia effectively controlled
four of the eight votes in the federal presidency and could block policies it

opposed. Id. at 26. For a brief discussion of the break-up of the SFRY and the
early days of the conflict, see Douglas Eisner, HumanitarianIntervention in the
Post-Cold War Era, 11 B.U. INTL L.J. 195, 215-19 (1993).
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begun to disintegrate because of inter-ethnic squabbling. 35 In
January 1990, in an attempt to save itself, the League voted to
end its monopoly on political power and instituted multi-party
elections in the republics. 3 6 In these elections, the Communists
lost control of the Slovenian government.3 7 By the end of 1990,
the Communists had also lost power in the Republics of
Croatia,3 8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 3 9 and Macedonia.4 °
These shifts in political power precipitated the dissolution of
the SFRY. In June 1990, the Republic of Slovenia declared itself
fully sovereign, 4 ' and on September 27, 1990, it became the first
republic to renounce the supremacy of federal law within its
territory. 42 In a December 23, 1990 referendum, Slovenian
citizens voted heavily in favor of independence. 4 3 Meanwhile, on
December 22, 1990, the parliament of the Republic of Croatia also
declared federal legislation inferior to its own. 4 4
Although Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia attempted to agree on
a future form of government for the SFRY, the effort failed when
Slovenia and Croatia advocated a loose confederation that would
have limited Serbia's control. 45 Displeased with the proposal,

35.

See BRANKA MAGAS, THE DESFRUCION OF YUGOSIAVIA:

TRACKING THE

BREAK-UP 1980-92, 327, 343-53 (1993). Originally, Slovenia and Croatia sought
to reform the SFRY by allowing a free market economy and democracy. Cohen,
supra note 34, at 26. Serbia and Montenegro, on the other hand, tried to
preserve the communist system and used their votes in the federal presidency to
reject the Slovene-Croat proposal. Id.
36.
See MAGAS, supra note 35, at 244-45. Only 28 of a total of 1,654
delegates voted against the measure, after a volatile debate in which personal
insults were common. Marlise Simons, Upheaval in the East: Yugoslavia; Yugoslav
Communists Vote to End Party Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1990, at A9.
37.
See MAGAS, supranote 35, at 244-45.
38.
CroatiaBecomes 2nd Yugoslav Province to Oust Communists, CHI. TRIB.,
May 11, 1990, at4.
39.
Nationalists Sweep Elections In Bosnia, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990, at
A2.
40.
John Tagliabue, Macedonians Vote for Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 1991, at Al.
41.
Nesho Djuric, Slovenia Declares Sovereignty, Seeks Confederation,UPI,
July 3, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. The declaration of
sovereignty passed by a vote of 187-83. Id. The declaration imposed the
requirement that federal law be consistent with the laws and constitution of
Slovenia to be enforceable in the Republic. Id.
42.
Id.
43.
The vote was 88.5% in favor of independence. Weller, supra note 30,
at 569.
44.
Weller, supra note 30, at 569.
Serbs in Croatia declared an
autonomous region of their own in October. Laura Silber, Serbs Proclaim
Autonomy in Croatia,FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 2, 1990, at 7.
45.
Weller, supranote 30, at 569-70. Croatia and Slovenia wanted a loose
confederation and more democratic institutions in their republics in order to end

the economic strain placed upon them by economically weaker Serbia. Serbia
demanded a strong centralized communist system that would ensure its
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Serbia severed negotiations and, claiming that the internal
borders of Yugoslavia were purely administrative, asserted that it
would seek to create a Greater Serbia. 4 6 On March 18, 1991, the
Serbian leadership, through the Yugoslav People's Army-and in
flagrant disregard of the Yugoslav Constitution-imposed martial
law over the SFRY. 4 7
The final blow to the SFRY occurred on May 15, 1991, when
Serbia and Montenegro blocked the election of Stipe Mesic of
Croatia to the Chair of the Presidency." On June 25, 1991, after
further negotiations had failed, Slovenia and Croatia declared
their independence. 49 Two days later, civil war erupted when the
50
Serb-controlled Yugoslav People's Army attacked Slovenia.
Slovenia declared war against the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia,
Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina) 5 ' controlled by Serbia, and
requested international mediation. 5 2 Shortly into the war, ethnic
Serbs living in Croatia began a policy of ethnic cleansing,
slaughtering Muslims and Croats in parts of Croatia,5 3 and the

continued access to the resources of more industrialized northern republics.
Webb, supranote 29, at 386 n.43.
MAGAS, supranote 35, at 242. This action by the Serbs was not a total
46.
surprise because Serbia had historical designs on complete and total control over

the federal government. In 1917, when the Yugoslav state was created out of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, Serbia achieved its dream of uniting the Southern
Slavs, held since it broke free from the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth
century. William Pfaff, Invitation to War, 72 FOR. AFF. 97, 103-04 (1993). The
new Yugoslav state had a Serbian king, and Serbs were in complete control. Id.
Thus, the Serb's control of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) alliance precipitated
the war to regain hegemony over other parts of the SFRY. See MAGAS, supra note
35, at 269-70 (discussing the role of the JNA in the early stages of the break-up).
In fact, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences issued a memorandum in 1989
that advocated joining areas of the SFRY with a Serb minority into a single state
on the pretext of protecting their minority rights. Cohen, supra note 34, at 27.
The disarmament of the Croat Territorial Defense Force began that year and was
nearly completed when Croatia held elections in 1990. Id. As Serb minorities in
Croatia began fighting Croat authorities, the JNA intervened to end the fighting,
but covertly supported the Serbs. Id.
Weller, supranote 30, at 570.
47.
48.
Alan Ferguson, Yugoslav Council Refuses to Elect Croat as Leader,
TORONTO STAR, May 15, 1991, atA21.
Nesho Djuric, Slovenia, CroatiaDeclare Independence From Yugoslavia,
49.
UPI, June 25, 1991, availablein LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
MAGAS, supranote 35, at 327-33.
50.
See supranote 30.
51.
52.
Tanner, supranote 2.
Bell-Fialkoff, supranote 4, at 116. The policy of ethnic cleansing was
53.
rooted in history: In 1941, the Croatian minister of education said "one third of
the Serbs we shall kill, another we shall deport, and the last we will force to
embrace the Roman Catholic religion and thus meld them into Croats." Id.
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Serb population of Bosnia-Herzegovina began its initial attempt to
consolidate the territory under its control.M
As the war escalated, still other republics of the SFRY
declared their independence. Bosnia-Herzegovina's Muslims and
Croats5s held a referendum on independence in March 1992.56
Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum and sought to establish
57
their own independent state within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Shortly after the referendum, on April 6, 1992, the European
Community recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent
state;5 8 the United States and Croatia followed suit the next
day.5 9 Full-scale war broke out among the Serbs, Muslims, and
Croats when the Bosnian Serbs declared their own independent
Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 7, 1992.60 Ten
days later, the republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared a new
"Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." 61 Although fighting among the
fledgling nations began as a virtual free-for-all, 62 by June 20,
1992, Bosnia had cemented an alliance with Croatia, which was
also fighting ethnic Serbs within its own territory, and declared a

54.
For a discussion of the armed conflicts and subsequent atrocities that
occurred immediately after Bosnian independence was declared, see HELSINKI
WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 27-29 (1992).
55.
Pfaff, supra note 46, at 101-02. The only real difference between
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims is their history; "[t]he notion of an exclusive, and
exclusionary, ethnic existence for each of the Yugoslav peoples is an invention."
Id. at 101. The South Slavs, as these people are collectively known, all speak the
same language. The Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet, whereas the Croats and
Muslims use the Latin alphabet, a remnant of the split of the Roman Empire that
placed the Croats within the jurisdiction of Rome and the Serbs under Byzantine
rule. Id. at 102. The Muslims are supposedly descendants of the Bogomils, a
group of heretics who, subsequent to persecution by the Orthodox church,
converted to Islam as the Ottoman Empire gained control of the Balkans. Id. at
102-03.
56.
Tim Judah, Muslims and Croats Vote for Bosnia Independence, TIMES
(London), March 2, 1992.
57.
HELSINKI WATCH, supranote 54, at 26.
58.
Eisner, supra note 34, at 225 n.150. In addition, Bosnia, Slovenia,
and Croatia were formally admitted to the United Nations on May 22, 1992, after
the European Community had recognized them from January to March. Id.
59.
U.S. Recognizes Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Agence
France Presse, Apr. 7, 1992, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
60.
HELSINKI WATCH, supra note 54, at 30. On this day, the Yugoslav
People's Army stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb-held areas in Croatia, and
Serbia itself, attacked Bosnian Croats, Croat regular army forces sent from
Croatia, and Moslem forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Id.
61.
John F. Bums, Confirming Split, Last 2 Republics Proclaim a Small New
Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1992, at Al.
62.
HELSINKI WATCH, supranote 54, at 30.

19951

YUGOSLAV WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

state of war.6 Since then, the majority of the fighting has been
confined to Bosnia and parts of Croatia.64
The United Nations reaction to the Yugoslav conflict typified
the world's rush to condemn Serbian aggression, but reluctance
to intervene. 65 Fighting in the former Yugoslavia proceeded for
several months before the United Nations took action. The
Security Council left the task of trying to resolve the conflict
67
initially to the European Community, 6 6 and later to NATO.
Eventually, on September 25, 1991, the UN Security Council
intervened by passing Resolution 713, which established an arms
embargo against all combatants. 6 8 Finally, in February 1992, the
United Nations dispatched the UN Peacekeeping Force pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 721.69
Since the beginning of the armed conflict in 1991, the
Bosnian government, the Bosnian Serbs, and Croatia have
repeatedly rejected peace proposals drafted by the European
Community and the United Nations. 70 The Serbs maintain that

63.
Id. at 31.
64.
See, e.g., Fighting Continues in the Former Yugoslavia, Cable News
Network, Jan. 27, 1993, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Script File
65.
Eisner, supranote 34, at 216.

66.
See King, supranote 1, at 350-5 1.
67.
See Weller, supranote 30.
68.
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991).
Interestingly, the arms embargo was suggested by the Yugoslav representative to
the United Nations. In the debate on this resolution, members of the Security
Council did not question the Yugoslav representative's authority to speak for all
the parties to the conflict and many expressly considered the conflict internal
rather than international. See generally Weller, supranote 30, at 577-81.
69.
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3018th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/721 (1992).
The mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force (UNPROFOR) is limited to
peacekeeping, not peacemaking, because the United Nations does not want to
appear to favor any single side involved in the conflict. UNPROFOR's task is to
assist the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees in providing
humanitarian relief to besieged civilian populations, to monitor troop movements,
and to ensure compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions. See, e.g., Judy
Dempsey, BosnianPeace ForceMay Prove Too Smal" A Look at the UN Soldier's
Role, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at 4.
70.
See Bosnian War: A Chronology of Conflict and Disunity, Deutsche

Presse Agentur, August 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
Meanwhile, the killing continues, much as it has throughout this century. Id. at
117. See also HELSINI WATCH, supra note 54, at 21 n.21 (providing an extensive

chronicle of violations of international humanitarian law).
Helsinki Watch
concludes that "[a]ll of the parties to the conflict have committed [grave breaches
of international humanitarian law] and all should be held accountable and
prosecuted for their abuses before impartial tribunals that afford the protection of
due process of law." Id. at 198.
During World War II, the Nazis initiated a campaign to eradicate the Serbs,
carried out by their allies-the Hungarians and the Bulgarians-both of whom
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past injustices justify the current round of killings, and other
combatants have replied in kind. 7 1 At the time of this writing, the
United Nations strategy has been to use the weapons of poverty
72
and isolation to force ethnic Serbs toward a peace settlement.
Although negotiations toward a settlement continue, recent
advances by Bosnian government forces have forced the Serbs to
rededicate themselves to fighting. An end to the war in the near
future seems unlikely. 73 Increasingly, public opinion in the
United States has shifted toward lifting the arms embargo against
and letting Bosnia fight the Serbs toward the negotiating
Bosnia,
74
table.
III. TWENTIETH CENTURY EXPERIENCE WITH WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
In the twentieth century, the international community has
contemplated establishing an international body to adjudicate war
crimes 7 s under international law only twice prior to the
It successfully
establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal.
implemented such an adjudicative body only once-after World
War II.76 Although the proceedings after the Second World War

occupied parts of Yugoslavia. Bell-Fialkoff, supra note 4, at 117. One in ten
Serbs died in World War H. Id.
71.
Nancy Nusser, Never Again? Old Hatreds Fuel the Killing, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Nov. 19, 1992 at A19. The Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina oppose
Bosnian independence and prefer to have a close association with Serbia because
they fear persecution, based on their experiences during World War II. HELSINKI
WATCH, supranote 54, at 46-47. They also believe that, as Serbs, they have the
right to live in one state with other Serbs: "insofar as other nationalities have
sought to secede from Yugoslavia, the Serbs have a right to secede from Croatia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, or any other Yugoslav republic." Id. Thus, the Serbian
forces have engaged in the strategy of occupying the area in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia where a large number of Serbs live and removing all other ethnic
groups to facilitate annexation by Serbia proper. Id.
The position of the Croats, on the other hand, is not as clear as that of the
Serbs or the Bosnians who wish to be independent. Some Croats support an
independent Bosnian state, while others want to see the western part of BosniaIndeed, Bosnian-Croats
Id. at 41-46.
Herzegovina annexed by Croatia.
proclaimed the "Community of Herceg-Bosna" which is to function as an
autonomous province within the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Id. The Croatian
government's position vacillates between these two positions. Id.

72.

David Rohde, This Land is Serb Land, Come Guns or Negotiators,

CHrMSIAN Sci. MONITOR, Dec. 29, 1994, at 6.

73.
See 4 Killed in Violence in Savajevo: Bosnians Promise They Will
Retaliate, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 9, 1994, at 12A.
See, e.g., Austin Bay, Arm Bosnians in this 'Graveyard of Good Guys,'
74.
HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 6, 1994, at 11.
The term "war crimes" encompasses primarily violations of the rights of
75.
individuals and thus crosses into the realm of international humanitarian law.
See infra part IV.C (discussing the nature of international humanitarian law).
See infra part 12I.B.
76.
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77
an
established a legal precedent for the Yugoslav Tribunal,
war
international
establish
to
attempts
of
earlier
examination

crimes tribunals illustrates the political and practical difficulties
that the Yugoslav Tribunal may face.
The first attempt came at the end of World War I in 1918.78
The victorious Allied and Associated Powers, principally motivated
by Great Britain, inserted provisions in the Treaty of Versailles
that required Germany to surrender high-ranldng military figures,
79
After
including German Kaiser Wilhelm II, for war crimes trials.
the
strictly,
provisions
several years of failing to enforce these
to
hoping
prosecutions,
crimes
Allies abandoned the idea of war
80
II,
War
World
after
attempt,
The second
preserve the peace.
was more successful.8 1 Upon the unconditional surrender of the
Germans and the Japanese, the Allies, this time led by the United
States, tried and convicted a significant number of war
82

criminals.

An analysis of these past experiences with war crimes
tribunals reveals that the unconditional surrender of one party is
a condition precedent to the successful prosecution of accused
war criminals. The trials of Nazi and Japanese war criminals

Prior to Nuremberg, the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 Respecting the
77.
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, was the
primary international convention dealing with the laws of war. The humanitarian
abuses during World War II led to the modem concept of human rights as ]us
cogens norms, which may not be ignored by the world community, and since
Nuremberg, international humanitarian law has been extensively codified in
international conventions. Jonathan I. Chamey, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87
AM. J. INTM L. 529, 543 (1993). Post World War II codifications of human rights
are the Geneva Convention (1) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the

Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (I)]; Geneva Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention (Ill) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in the Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)]; Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention]; Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979); the Geneva Protocol II Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
(1979).
See infra part III.A.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
See infra part III.B.
81.

82.

Id.
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after World War II succeeded, in part, because all defeated
governments ceased to exist at the end of the war, giving the
victorious powers complete physical and political control of the

defeated nations.8 3

The continued existence of the defeated

German government at the end of World War I precluded the
possibility of "victors' justice," which was crucial to the success of
the trials after World War II at Nuremberg and Tokyo. 8 4 No
international tribunal has ever succeeded without a "broadly
supported," victorious coalition that "has defeated an obvious
aggressor and violator of the laws of war and humanity so
85
decisively as to place it in a state of deballatio."
The Yugoslav Tribunal represents the first attempt by a noncombatant-the United Nations-to try individuals for crimes
committed in a war in which there will be no clear victor,8 6 and in
which the accused themselves will control the peace negotiation
87
process.
A. World War I
After the First World War, the Allied and Associated Powers
resolved to create an international tribunal to prosecute
individuals accused of violating the laws of war.8 8 The attempt to

83.
See generally Elizabeth L. Pearl, Note, Punishing Balkan War Criminals:
Could the End of Yugoslavia Provide an End to Victors' Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1373, 1401 (1993).
Pearl argues that the lack of "victors' justice" in
prosecuting individuals for war crimes raises serious problems with planning who
and how may people to prosecute; gaining custody of high-level governmental
officials; timing the trials to avoid inciting further violence; avoiding the criticism
of cultural imperialism; and obtaining evidence as well as custody of persons
accused of crimes. Pearl concludes that the international community should be

very careful in engaging in these prosecutions in order to vindicate international
humanitarian law without undermining it with shoddy justice. Id.
84.
"Victors' justice" is an argument raised by critics of war crimes trials
who "[d]oubt the motives of the prosecutors . . . [and] perceive potential
unfairness in the war crimes punitive process because it involves the trying of the
vanquished by the victors. The result, they argue, is that the trials are concerned
with punishment at the expense of impartial findings of fact." Pearl, supra note
83, at 1399. But see Akhavan, supra note 6, at 282 n.53 (arguing that such an
argument is too simplistic to have any merit because it ignores the fact that the
right to have a trial is waivable under international law).
85.
William V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedentand the Gulf War, 31 VA.
J. INrL L. 391, 398 (1991).
86.
Pearl, supranote 83, at 1400. Pearl rightly warns that even though the
Tribunal represents the first time the United Nations has the moral superiority,
prestige, and "sheer willpower" to initiate war crimes trials, unless it is impartial
and tries criminals from all sides, the fact that it is not a party to the war will
have a detrimental effect on the status of international law. Id.
87.
D'Amato, supra note 10, at 501.
88.
JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE To NUREMBERG: THE POLMCS AND DIPLOMACY
OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRSr WORLD WAR 1 (1982) [hereinafter
PROLOGUE]. Prior to World War I, war crimes were traditionally prosecuted by the
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try war criminals failed for a number of reasons, including: the
enormity of the undertaking;8 9 deficiencies in international law
and in the specific provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, 9 0 which
proved to be unworkable; 9 1 the failure of the Allies to present a
united front to the Germans and to take strong measures to
enforce the treaty; 92 and strong German nationalism. 93
The
victors' lack of control over affairs within Germany ultimately
defeated the Allied attempt to bring accused war criminals to
94

justice.
The modern concept of a war crimes tribunal originated at
the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, when the victorious
Allies appointed the Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties (Commission
on Responsibility).9" The Commission on Responsibility was
charged with determining the extent to which Germany and its
allies violated the laws and customs of war, assessing the level of
individual responsibility, and drafting a statute for a tribunal to

accused's own nation or by military reprisals by the offended state. Hugh H. L.
Bellot, War Crimes: Their Prevention and Punishment, 2 THE GROTITUS SOCIETY 31,

34-35 (1916). At the conclusion of hostilities, it was customary to grant amnesty
to all persons accused of war crimes. PROLOGUE, supra, at 19.
89.
Originally, the Allies demanded the surrender of 854 men for trial.
PROLOGUE, supra note 88, at 113. Ultimately, the Allies demanded that the
Germans try 45 cases, of which only 12 were actually tried at Leipzig, with six of
the trials ending in conviction. Two of those convicted later escaped prison. Id. at
126.
90.
Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, 11 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (ser. 3) 323, reprinted in 13 AM. J. INrTL L. 151 (Supp. 1919) (official
documents) [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
91.
The Treaty of Versailles articles governing war crimes trials were poorly
thought out and failed to provide the Allied military tribunals with jurisdiction
and the power to impose penalties. UNnED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
HISTORY OF THE UNIED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE LAWS OF WAR 52 (1948) [hereinafter UNIED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION].
92.
See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
93.
PROLOGUE, supra note 88, at 124. Willis cites German nationalism as
the primary element contributing to the failure of war crimes trials: "Germans
momentarily forgot their many antagonisms as they united to oppose Allied
demands.... In the trauma of defeat, German nationalists, to protect the image
of the army, had already convinced themselves of the truth of two myths:
Germany bore no responsibility for the war, and the army had been 'stabbed in
the back." Id. at 125. These two beliefs played a significant role in the rise of
Adolph Hitler and the Nazis during the inter-war era. For a discussion of the
political and social climate of Weimar Germany, see generally EBERHARD KOLB,
THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC (P.S. Falla trans., 1988).
94.
Pearl, supra note 83, 1389-90.
95.
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on

Enforcement of Penalties: Report Presented to the PreliminaryPeace Conference,
Mar. 29, 1919, reprintedin 14 AM J. INTL L. 95 (1920) [hereinafter Commission on
Responsibility Report].
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try accused war criminals. 9 6 Concluding that "[e]very belligerent
has, according to international law, the power and authority to try
the individuals alleged to be guilty of [war crimes] . . . if such

persons have been taken prisoners or have otherwise fallen into
its power,"97 the Commission recommended that any peace treaty
provide for an international tribunal to prosecute war criminals. 98
The Commission on Responsibility proffered a series of acts
deemed war crimes, which were subsequently codified into
international law. 99 The Commission grouped these acts into four
96.
Id.
97.
Id. at 121.
98.
Id. at 121. The United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan
were to appoint three judges each. Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Romania,

Serbia, and Czechoslovakia were to appoint one judge each. Id. at 122.
99.

The following acts were deemed war crimes:

(1) Murders and massacres; systematic terrorism
(2) Putting hostages to death
(3) Torture of civilians
(4) Deliberate starvation of civilians
(5) Rape
(6) Abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced
prostitution
(7) Deportation of civilians
(8) Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions
(9) Forced labor of civilians in connection with the military operations of
the enemy
(10) Usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation
(11) Compulsory enlistment of soldiers among the inhabitants of
occupied territory
(12) Attempts to denationalize the occupants of occupied territory
(13) Pillage
(14) Confiscation of property
(15) Exaction of illegitimate or of exorbitant contributions and
requisitions
(16) Debasement of the currency, and issue of spurious currency
(17) Imposition of collective penalties
(18) Wanton devastation and destruction of property
(19) Deliberate bombardment of undefended places
(20) Wanton destruction of religious, charitable, educational, and historic
buildings and monuments
(21) Destruction of merchant ships and passenger vessels without
warning and without provision for the safety of passengers or crew
(22) Destruction of fishing boats and of relief ships
(23) Deliberate bombardment of hospitals
(24) Attack on and destruction of hospital ships
(25) Breach of other rules relating to the Red Cross
(26) Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases
(27) Use of explosive or expanding bullets, and other inhuman appliances
(28) Directions to give no quarter
(29) Ill-treatment of wounded and prisoners of war
(30) Employment of prisoners of war on unauthorized works
(31) Misuse of flags of truce
(32) Poisoning of wells.
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categories:
(1) offenses committed in prison camps against
civilians and soldiers of the Allies; (2) offenses committed by
officials who issued orders in the German campaign against Allied
armies; (3) offenses committed by all persons of authority,
including the German Kaiser, who failed to stop violations of laws
and customs of war despite knowledge of those acts; and (4) any
other offenses committed by the Central Powers that national
courts should not be allowed to adjudicate. 100
Because of serious disagreement among the Allies on the
desirability of a war crimes tribunal,1 0 1 the recommendations of
the Commission on Responsibility were incorporated only to a
This limited
limited extent into the Treaty of Versailles. 1° 2
incorporation was fatal because the treaty provisions pertaining

proved unworkable in the post-war
to war crimes ultimately
03
1

political context.
Article 227 of the Treaty was the most remarkable of its
provisions. It formally indicted the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II,

and provided for a special tribunal to try him. 104 Article 227 also

Id. at 114-15.
100. Id. at 121-22. At the end of World War I in 1919, the major
international instruments relating to the laws of war were the two Hague
Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899 and 1907.
PROLOGUE, supra note 88, at 5. Other sources of information on the laws of war
included national military manuals and Geneva Conferences beginning in 1864.
See James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of
War, 14 AM. J. INrL L. 70 (1920) (general discussion of laws and customs of war
in various states military regulations at the outbreak of the war in 1914).
101.
The United States disagreed with the Commission's recommendation
to subject heads of state to prosecution by an international tribunal. It argued
that heads of state are protected by sovereign immunity and are responsible only
to their own people and domestic judicial systems. Memorandum of Reservations
Presented by the Representatives of the United States to the Report of the
Commission on Responsibiities,April 4, 1919, Annex II, reprintedin 14 AM. J. IN'VL
L. 127, 147-48 (1920). The United States also opposed the creation of an
international tribunal because such a body lacked any precedent in international
law and violated the United States constitutional prohibition of applying law ex
post facto. Id. at 146-47. In addition, the United States objected to the
application of the doctrine of negative criminality because it could only be applied
when the accused knew in advance that violations of the laws and customs of war
were subject to criminal sanctions. Id. at 143. Finally, the United States objected
to the application of "laws [and principles] of humanity," which were imprecise
and lacked a "fixed and universal standard.' I& at 144.
102.
PROLOGUE, supra note 88, at 52-62.
103. Id.
104. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 90, art. 227. Article 227 charged the
tribunal with trying the Kaiser "guided by the highest motives of international
policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international
undertakings and the validity of international morality.' This charge, because it
was based on morality and not law, deprived the former Kaiser of legal protection
because he could not appeal any judgment with a legal argument. This policy
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called upon the government of the Netherlands, which had
granted the Kaiser asylum after he abdicated control of the
German government,10 5 to surrender him to the Allies for trial. 10
Articles 228 to 230 addressed the prosecutions of other
German officers for violations of the laws and customs of war.
Article 228 required the German government to recognize the
right of the Allies to try Germans accused of violating the laws
and customs of war, and to surrender all individuals accused of
war crimes to the Allies for punishment in accordance with the
newly formulated laws promulgated by the Commission on
Responsibility. l °0 Article 229 provided that any Allied power that
accused a German of war crimes against its nationals was entitled
to try him before its own national military courts. When more
than one Allied power was involved, the accused would be
brought before a tribunal comprised of individuals from the
military courts of the concerned Allied nations.1 0 8 Finally, Article
230 required Germany to surrender any and all information
requested for the prosecution of accused9 officers and for the
identification of additional war criminals.1°
The effort to create a war crimes tribunal after World War1 0I
was met with the qualified optimism of some commentators.1
Since the beginning of the war, these commentators believed that
politically motivated inaction in prosecuting war crimes would set
a bad precedent for future wars, namely, meeting aggression with
complacency."' However, by the end of the war on November 11,

smacked of "victor's justice" and easily could have been avoided had the Allies
accepted the Commission's recommendation and tried the former Kaiser for

violations of the laws and customs of war, thereby providing him with legal
protections and avoiding any ex postfacto issue. PROLOGUE, supranote 88, at 8081.
105. The Netherlands, traditionally a "refuge for the vanquished,"
recognized that the Allies could not agree on how to handle the ex-Kaiser and
"concluded that it could safely reject any request for the surrender of the Kaiser."
Id. at 98. Interestingly, a group of American soldiers led by Colonel Luke Lea, a
former United States Senator and publisher of the Nashville Tennessean,
attempted to abduct the Kaiser and bring him to Paris. They succeeded in gaining
entry to the estate where the Kaiser was'located, but were surrounded by Dutch
troops and forced to withdraw. The Allies never came closer to gaining custody of
the Kaiser. Id. at 100-0 1.
106. Treaty of Versailles, supranote 90, art. 227.
107. Id. art. 228.

108.

Id. art. 229.

109.

Id. art. 230.

110.

See, e.g., Bellot, supranote 88, at 54.

111.

Id. Bellot remarked:

It rests, therefore, with the Allied Governments, after carefully weighing
the probabilities, to decide whether the strict enforcement, after due
notice, of the generally accepted laws and usages of war would be likely to
place some limit to their violation by the enemy, or whether such action
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1918, public opinion, which had strongly favored war crimes
trials, dissipated, and the victorious Allies found themselves
1 12
In
unable to remain united in their commitment to such trials.
addition, the Allied Powers lack of control over substantial parts
of the German Reich and their inability to arrest the Kaiser-the
chief war criminal in the eyes of the Commission on
Responsibility and the British public113 -jeopardized the idea of
war crimes prosecution. Any Allied attempt to begin war crimes
trials would require significant political maneuvering to obtain
Germany's cooperation. 114 The United States and Great Britain

would be more likely to result in reprisals upon the prisoners in the hands
of the Central Empires. Whatever may be the immediate decision,
however, of the Entente Powers, the public opinion of the civilised world
will not rest satisfied unless, upon the termination of the conflict, not only
the instigators but also the actual perpetrators of the more heinous
offences against the usages of war are brought to trial before some
impartial tribunal.
Unless such action be taken-and the tendency in official quarters
will no doubt be towards smoothing over these troublesome terms in the
peace settlement-precedents will have been created which will render war
in the future even more terrible to the non-combatants, belligerent and
neutral alike.... The right to commit atrocities in the name of military
necessity, claimed by the Central Powers, must not go unchallenged.

Id.
112.

PROLOGUE, supra note 88, at 52-62.

See PROLOGUE, supra note 88, at 52-62 (describing the politics of the
113.
British election of 1918, in which Prime Minister Lloyd George exploited British
animosity towards the Kaiser and promised to bring him to justice for his crimes);
id. at 87-91 (reproducing Punch cartoons that indicate the prevailing British
public opinion of the Kaiser during the war).
See generally HAJO HOLBORN, A HISTORY OF MODERN GERMANY 1840114.
1945, 504-32 (1982) (discussing the events of the fall of the Imperial German
government at the end of World War I). On October 28, 1918, at the insistence of
the Allies with whom the German government was negotiating an armistice, a new
German constitution went into effect, making the Reich a constitutional
monarchy similar to that of Great Britain. Id. at 504-09. The Kaiser's prestige
among the German people had waned during the armistice negotiations because
President Woodrow Wilson implied that peace could not be made while Kaiser.
Wilhelm still sat on the throne. Id at 509-10. In November 1918, a group of
sailors revolted against the government in the northern German port of Kiel and
demanded the release of hundreds of sailors who had refused to obey orders. Id.
at 511-12. At about the same time, Bavaria and Berlin shook with revolution as
socialists took control of the governments. Id. at 512-19. The Social Democrats
who had gained control demanded that the Kaiser abdicate in favor of the Crown
Prince, but the Kaiser refused. Id. at 513-14. Nevertheless, on November 9, 1918,
Chancellor Prince Max von Baden announced the Kaiser's abdication on the
assumption that he would abdicate. Id. at 514-15. These events led to the end of
imperial Germany; a republic was proclaimed, the socialists took control of the
government, and the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918. Id. at 515-18.
Under the Armistice, the Allies took control of the Rhine, and the rest of Germany
was soon consumed by civil war. Id. at 518-32.
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were convinced that a failure of the war crimes trials would call
the terms of the entire peace settlement into question; hence, they
did not aggressively pursue Germany to hand over accused war
115

criminals.
The victors' lack of control over affairs within Germany
proved to be the downfall of the Allied attempt to bring accused
war criminals to justice. 116 When revolution shook Germany after
the war, prompting the Kaiser to abdicate and flee to the
Netherlands, the possible spread of Bolshevism and general
unrest became more immediate concerns to the Allies than their
desire to try the Kaiser and other war criminals." 7 The Allies
eventually abandoned the idea of enforcing Articles 228 to 230,
fearing that enforcement would spark either civil war within
Germany or a new war between the Allies and Germany. 1 8 The
Allies eventually permitted the Germans themselves to try
accused war criminals." 9 However, the German trials, conducted
at Leipzig in 1921, resulted in few convictions and light

sentences. 120

115.
d. at 113.
116.
Pearl, supra note 83, 1389-90. See also PROLOGUE, supra note 88, at
113-25 (describing the disagreement between the French and the British over
whether and how to enforce the war crimes articles of the Treaty of Versailles in
light of the fragile political situation inside Germany and their fear that the
Bolsheviks might take over amidst the chaos that would result from enforcement).
117.
This discontent stemmed, in part, from the harsh terms of the Treaty
of Versailles. See generally PROLOGUE, supranote 88, at 98-112.
118.
Id. at 113, 116.
The Germans made it clear to the Allies that
surrendering their accused war criminals presented a serious threat to Germany's
internal stability, which was already seriously compromised.
See Remigiusz
Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definftion, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
ENFORCEMENT 29, 35, 181-85 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987).
1'19.
See PROLOGUE, supra note 88, at 113-25. By 1920, Wilson was ill and
the United States Senate had refused to give its advice and consent to the Treaty
of Versailles. The implementation of the Treaty was left to France and Great
Britain. France claimed that Articles 227-30 were included in the Treaty only
because of British desires. France was willing to waive these articles if the
German government paid "compensation" for the waiver. The British, on the
other hand, wanted the Germans to surrender a few high-level officials in order to
make an example of them. Germany took advantage of this impasse because

"[nio German government could survive a surrender of its citizens to a foreign
tribunal . . . and because no Allied government could renounce the penalty
clauses completely." Id. at 118. Thus, in December 1919, the German Reichstag
passed a law giving jurisdiction over war criminals to Germany's Supreme Court
at Leipzig. The British and French still disagreed; the French wanted Germany to
default on the trials and then keep control over the occupied territories, whereas
the British wanted to try a few Germans. Finally, to avoid undermining the entire
peace settlement, the Allies agreed to let the Germans conduct the trials with
Allied oversight. Id. at 126.
120.
Id. at 126. The German government had originally promised that
"Germany would give all conceivable guarantees of the impartial and firm
execution of the proceedings, especially through the assistance of official
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The post-World War I attempt to conduct war crimes trials
illustrates the difficulties that the United Nations may face in
administering the Yugoslav Tribunal. Like the Allies after World
War I, the United Nations does not control the national
12 1
governments of soldiers and officers accused of war crimes.
Moreover, the United Nations primary focus on the crimes of only
one party to the war, Serbia, creates the danger that any decision
by the Tribunal will be dismissed as biased. 122 The factual
similarities between the circumstances at the end of World War I
and those in the former Yugoslavia today should alert the United
Nations to the difficulties it may encounter in prosecuting war
I2 3
criminals.
Nevertheless, the United Nations should also note that,
although the World War I tribunal failed with respect to its
immediate task of prosecuting accused war criminals, it still

served a valuable function in building lasting peace. The Allies
initially insisted on war crimes trials, but later relinquished their
right to try war criminals to ensure the integrity of the peace
Thus, the Allied Powers experience with the
settlement.' 2 4
tribunal demonstrates that the very threat of war crimes trials
may serve as a bargaining chip that eventually can be traded for
peace. 125 Indeed, some commentators contend that following
through on threatened war crimes trials may actually undermine
peace efforts: Insisting on prosecuting high-level government
officials, who would otherwise be willing to accept a peace
settlement in exchange for amnesty from prosecution, would

representatives of the interested opposition states." Bierzanek, supranote 118, at
35-36.
Meron, supra note 8, at 123. "Except in the case of a total defeat or
121.
subjugation-for example, Germany after World War H-prosecutions of enemy
personnel accused of war crimes have been both rare and difficult." Id122. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights appointed Mr.
Tadensz Mazowiecki as the Special Rapporteur charged with the task of
The Special
investigating human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.
Rapporteur submitted a series of reports which concluded that the primary

victims of human rights abuses are Bosnian Muslims who suffer under the
Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing. The Special Rapporteur acknowledged that as
the war continues, all sides increasingly are committing human rights abuses.

See Joyner, supranote 4, at 248-5 1.
123. "The Versailles Treaty after World War I illustrates the case of a
On the other hand, after the four
defeated but not wholly occupied state ....
principal victorious and occupying powers established an international military
tribunal (IMT) following World War II.... [it] functioned reasonably well; the Allies
had supreme authority over Germany and thus could often find and arrest the
accused, obtain evidence and make arrangements for extradition .... " Meron,
supranote 8, at 123-25.

124.
125.

See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
See generally D'Amato, supra note 10.
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prolong the conflict instead of expediting a settlement.1 2 6 From a
realpolitikperspective, each side may have more to lose politically
by insisting on prosecutions than it would stand to gain.
B. World War tf
At the end of World War II in 1945, the victorious Allies were
in complete control of Germany and Japan, both of which had
surrendered unconditionally. 127
The Allies' wartime goal of
conducting war crimes trials12 8 was realized in trials after the war
at Nuremberg and Tokyo. 129 Wary of the precedent set by the
failed attempt to hold war crimes trials under the Treaty of
130
Versailles and by unsuccessful efforts of the League of Nations,
the Allies organized courts and conducted trials in Nuremberg

126.
Barbara Franklin, Bosnia: The New Nuremberg, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 26,
1994, at Al.
127.
PROLOGUE, supra note 88, at 175.
The Allies demanded an
unconditional surrender by Germany, and got it: "Because the Second World War
was waged to a total victory, the victors were . . . able to carry out their plans
virtually unopposed [by a functioning, albeit defeated, government], achieving
results that the earlier effort [after World War I] did not." Id. In Japan, on the
other hand, the peace settlement was actually negotiated; however, negotiations
were conducted very quickly, and the Japanese government was not in a position
to haggle with the Allies over the issue of war crimes trials. D'Amato, supranote
10, at 501.
128.
President Roosevelt issued a statement on October 7, 1942, in which
he stated, "I now declare it to be the intention of this Government that the
successful cose of the war shall include provision for the surrender to the United
Nations of war criminals." Statement by the President, reprinted in REPORT OF
ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPRESENTAIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY
TRIALS 9 (1945) [hereinafter JACKSON REPORT].
129.
The Japanese surrender was not totally unconditional because
Emperor Hirohito was allowed to remain on the throne. D'Amato, supra note 10,
at 501; DONALD A. WELLS, WAR CRIMES AND LAWS OF WAR 97 (2d ed. 1991). This
Note does not discuss the Tokyo trials because they were riddled with legal flaws,
making them of questionable precedential value for any future war crimes trials.
In fact, after the Tokyo trials, defense counsel for each defendant filed an appeal,
complaining of unfairness. Id. at 102-03. For a detailed discussion of the
proceedings at Tokyo, see generally RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS, JUSIICE: THE
TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971).
130.
The League of Nations attempted to establish an international criminal
court and even opened a convention for signature in 1937.
See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Introduction to the History of Establishing an International Criminal
Court, in 3 INTERNA ONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 118, 181-85 (M. Cherif

Bassiouni ed., 1987). India was the only state to ratify the convention before
World War II scuttled the effort. Id. For an overview of recent efforts to establish
an international criminal court, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Need for an
International Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992); Benjamin B. Ferencz, An InternationalCriminalCode and
Court Where They Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L.
375 (1992); M. CherifBassiouni, supranote 11.
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and Tokyo, 13 1 supported by the United States Treasury and aided
by the copious documentation of war crimes maintained by the
13 2
defeated governments themselves.
The trials at Nuremberg were a watershed in the history of
international law because, "confronted with a choice between the
release, summary punishment and trial of the Nazis, the Allies
chose to provide the Nazis 'what they had denied their own

Although the
opponents-the protection of the Law.'l
Nuremberg trials were admittedly biased-in the words of one

Nuremberg judge, 13

"vengeance and vindication necessarily

required the sacrifice of legal principle'13 5-they nevertheless
spawned a human rights revolution that has "provided symbolic

of individuals while
assurance of the value of human dignity
13 6
having limited practical significance."

authorized
the
which
Charter, 13 7
The
Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, identified three
types of crimes for which the defeated Germans were ultimately
tried: (1) crimes against peace, 13 8 (2) war crimes,' 3 9 and (3)

131. WELLS, supra note 129, at 97-98. As of January 1949, the Allies had
held 2,116 military trials, 950 of which were conducted by the United States. Id.

at 101.
132. Franklin, supranote 126, at Al.
133. Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty Years Later, 7 CONN. J. INrL L. 1,
37 (1991) (quoting Henry L. Stimpson, The Nuremberg Trial Landmark in Law, 25
FOR. AFF. 179, 179-80 (1947)).
134. Id. at 37. See generally JACKSON REPORT, supra note 128, at 97-118
(reviewing discussions among delegates of the United States, France, the USSR,
and Great Britain over the need for an independent judicial body to convict the
accused, rather than relying on political convictions).
Lippman, supra note 133, at 45. For a discussion of the legal
135.
irregularities that occurred at Nuremberg, see generally id. at 37-45. These
irregularities included the use of unheard-of legal doctrines against the Germans,
the lack of any detailed legal analysis in the judgments rendered, and the use of
evidence as a secondary consideration in determining guilt. Id.
136.
Id. at 53.
137.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 284, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 128, at 422 [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter].
138.
Id. art. 6(a). Crimes against peace were defined as "planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Id.
139.
Id. art. 6(b). War crimes were defined as "violations of the laws or
customs of war," including, but not limited to, "murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity." Id.
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crimes against humanity. 14° At the time of the Nuremberg trials,
however, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity were
novel concepts in international law. The doctrine of nullum
14 1
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (nullum crimen sine lege)
prohibits the prosecution of crimes not clearly established in law;
therefore, the legality of prosecuting accused German war
criminals for crimes against peace and humanity is questionable.
This weakness has allowed critics of the Nuremberg proceedings
to attack the legal basis of the International Military Tribunal on
several grounds. First, critics have argued that the accused were
unfairly prosecuted ex post facto.14 2
Second, the various
international conventions on the laws and customs of war that

were in force in 1945 did not provide for criminal sanctions if they
were violated. 14 Finally, as a corollary, some critics have argued
that the Allied Powers had no legal right to try the defeated
Germans and, thus, exercised arbitrary and illegal victor's

justice. 14 4 Generally regarded as procedurally fair, even by those
who defended the accused, 145 the International Military Tribunal

140. Id. art 6(c). Crimes against humanity were defined as "murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated." Id. Cf. Genocide Convention,
supra note 77.
141. "Unless there is a law, there can be no crime; unless there is a law,
there can be no punishment." MINAR, supranote 129, at 61. Bassiouni explains
that "it is a principle generally recognized in criminal law that crimes must be
clearly defined and that sanctions must be specified before one can be held
responsible for committing a proscribed act.' M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against
Humanity, in INTERNAI1ONAL CRIMINAL LAW 51, 59 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987).
The two parts of the doctrine, although distinct, are very similar; because many
commentaries simply refer to nullum crimen sine lege, the doctrine will be denoted
in this manner for the remainder of this Note. See, e.g., Report of the SecretaryGeneral Pursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., at 9, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
revised by U.N. DOC. S/25704/Corr. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General's
Report]. For a discussion of the legal issues that arose from the indictments and
proceedings at Nuremberg, see generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against
Humanity, supra, at 58-65.
142. FREDERICK H. MAUGHAM, U.N.O. AND WAR CRIMES (Greenwood Press ed.,
1975) (1951).
143. For a vehement condemnation of the prosecution of crimes against
humanity and crimes against peace at Nuremberg, see id.
144. Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 833,
860 (1990). See also MINEAR, supra note 129, at 35-73 (discussing the problems
of applying a new body of international law, created especially for the proceedings
at Nuremberg and Tokyo); Bassiouni, Nuremberg: Forty Years Later, supra note
26, at 64.
145. Fogelson, supra note 144, at 860. Otto Pannenbecker, defense
counsel for one of the Nazi defendants at Nuremberg, stated: "As to the
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was able to overcome these allegations in its published
opinions.14 s However, such criticisms have continued to plague
the Nuremberg legacy and may play a role in the proceedings of
the Yugoslav Tribunal as well. 147

The Nuremberg trials and subsequent developments in

international humanitarian law provide. a legal precedent for the
Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal. Since the end of World War II,
international humanitarian law has refined and codified the
concepts of "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity;"1 4 8

consequently, the prosecution of these crimes by the Yugoslav
Tribunal should not be subject to challenge under the doctrine of
nullum crimen sine lege.14 9 The concept of genocide, on the other

application of the Anglo-Saxon system at Nuremberg, there was no disadvantage
for those accused before the Tribunal." Id. (citation omitted).
For a discussion of the legal justifications for applying the newly
146.
created doctrines of crimes against peace and humanity, see Bassiouni,
Nuremberg: Forty Years Later, supra note 26, at 61-63; Bierzanek, supra note
118, at 52-70.
147.
See, e.g., Meron, supranote 8, at 128 ("The first international tribunal
established by the international community since World War II should apply only
those provisions of international law that are clear and generally accepted and
establish the individual criminal liability of persons, not just the civil
responsibility of the state.").
The Yugoslav Tribunal has been called "trickier than Nuremberg* because of
uncertainty over which law actually applies to the conflict in the former SFRY and
the lack of a clear chain of command, especially with regard to the Bosnian Serbs.
Franklin, supra note 126, at Al. For example, it is likely that the defense will
argue that the Statute of the Tribunal, discussed infra, at notes 160, 179-255 and
accompanying text, does not uniformly apply international humanitarian law
worldwide. IdL In addition, the probability that, unlike at Nuremberg, the chain
of command-and therefore responsibility for ordering illegal actions--is not welldocumented will contribute to serious delays in actual litigation, as will the
tightness of the rules of evidence and procedure for the Tribunal. Id. Finally,
because genocide requires a specific intent, the lack of the above conditions will
make it much more difficult to prove accusations thereof. Id.
148. The General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously "affirm[ed]
the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nfiremberg
Tribunal and judgment of the Tribunal" in 1946. See Affirmation of the Principles
of International Law Recognized by the Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res.
The
95, U.N. GAOR, 1st. Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946).
international agreements listed supra note 77 also owe their existence to
proceedings at Nuremberg. War crimes and crimes against humanity are similar
concepts dealing with how people and property are to be treated by belligerent
states in the course of conducting war. Christopher Greenwood, The International
TribunalforFormerYugoslavia, 69 INr'LAFF. 641, 645 (1993). The overlap occurs
because war crimes extend beyond mere acts committed in the heat of battle and
include any act constituting a grave breach of the laws of war, as long as the
mens rea requirement is met.
149.
The third type of crime prosecuted at Nuremberg, crimes against
peace, was defined in Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter, supra note 137. It
has not been incorporated directly into the statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal
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hand, although codified in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), 150
has not yet been subject to judicial interpretation, leaving its
151
status in international law relatively unclear.
The post-World War II human rights movement and the
multilateral human rights conventions signed since the war are
based on the human rights principles first enunciated at
Nuremberg. 15 2 One of the most significant legacies of Nuremburg
is that individuals are now considered bound by the international
1 53
human rights regime in the same manner as nation states.
The tragedy of the Nuremberg legacy is that despite the numerous
violations of international conventions that have since occurred,
1
no individual has ever been prosecuted for violating them, 54
perhaps because the world has not seen an unconditional

because no international conventions specifically make waging an aggressive war
illegal and because of disagreement among states on the meaning of "aggression."
Despite attempts to define illegal aggression since the establishment of the United
Nations, no international conventions are in force, with the exception of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, which renounced war as "an instrument of foreign policy."
General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of Foreign Policy, art. I,
entered into force July 24, 1929,46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter similarly provides that "[a]ll
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N.
CHARER art. 2(4). In 1974, the General Assembly passed a resolution defining
aggression as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.... ." G.A. Res. 3314,

U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Annex, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX) (1974).

The Yugoslav Tribunal's statute does not give it jurisdiction to prosecute
"crimes against peace" because of the uncertain position of the concept in
international law. See Bassiouni, Nuremberg:Forty Years Later, supra note 26, at
61. In addition, if the Tribunal had jurisdiction over crimes against peace, it

would have to investigate the causes of the conflict, thus involving itself in the
political aspects of the conflict, which it must avoid at all costs. James C.
O'Brien, The InternationalTribunalfor Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
in the FormerYugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INrL L. 639, 645 (1993).
150.
Genocide Convention, supranote 77.
151.
For a discussion of problems facing a judicial body interpreting the
provisions of the Genocide Convention, see generally Webb, supra note 29, at
389-99. For a discussion of modern developments in establishing norms of
international law outside the treaty process, see Chamey, supranote 77.
152.
Lippman, supra note 133, at 51. The human rights movement is
based, in part, on "the desire to ensure that there would be no repetition of the
type of atrocities and abuses which were committed by the German regime, as
well as the pragmatic concern that abuses of state power would lead to internal
strife and renewed international instability." Id.
153.
Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of
IndividualsRather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
154.
Pearl, supra note 83, at 1397.
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surrender at the end of a war since 1945.1s s Recent examples of
attempts to establish other war crimes tribunals include efforts
156 and Rwanda.15 7
after the Gulf War

155. D'Amato, supranote 10, at 501.
156. Pearl, supra note 83, at 1397. The Gulf War of 1991 was the first postCold War military action justified, in part, by international humanitarian law.
Following the conflict, in which United Nations forces were led by the United
States, Great Britain, and France to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, legal
commentators such as Louis Rend Beres sought the establishment of war crimes
trials for the prosecution of the Iraqi leadership, but their calls went unheeded.
See, e.g., Louis Rend Beres, Iraqi Crimes and InternationalLaw: The Imperative to
Punish, 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 335 (1993); Louis Rend Beres, Prosecuting
IraqiCrimes: Fulflling the Expectations of InternationalLaw After the Gulf War, 10
DICK. J. INrL L. 425 (1992); Louis Rend Beres, Toward Prosecutionof IraqiCrimes
UnderInternationalLaw: JurisprudentialFoundationsand JurisdictionalChoices, 22
CAL. W. INI% L.J. 127 (1991). Although the United Nations coalition had several
high-level Iraqi officials in custody, no steps were taken to try any of them for war
crimes despite congressional debates on the issue. Id. The limited objective of
removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the resulting cease-fire agreement, and the
fact that coalition forces themselves committed some egregious acts in which
civilians were killed, led to the decision to forgo prosecutions. Id. Nevertheless,
the situation in the former Yugoslavia is even less amenable to war crimes trials
because, unlike the Gulf War in which the United Nations was a party to the
cease-fire, the United Nations has left the task of establishing a peaceful
settlement to the parties of the conflict, who are also the individuals responsible
for committing war crimes; therefore, the United Nations is not in a position to
demand the terms of peace. The complete military defeat of Iraq obviated the
need for war crimes trials to induce a peace settlement. Id.
On August 2,
1990, Iraqi forces
invaded Kuwait-its
southern
neighbor-claiming it as the nineteenth province of Iraq. After Iraq ignored a
series of Security Council Resolutions condemning Iraq's actions and demanding
a return to the status quo, the United Nations initiated offensive military
operations to "liberate" Kuwait on January 16, 1991. S.C. Res. 661 (8/6/90),
U.N. SCOR, 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990), reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1325
(acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and calling for economic
sanctions against Iraq); S.C. Res. 662 (8/9/90), U.N. SCOR, 2934th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/662 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1327 (declaring Iraq's annexation
of Kuwait null and void); S.C. Res. 664 (8/18/90), U.N. SCOR, 2937th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/664 (1990), reprinted in 29 IL.M. 1328 (demanding that Iraq (1)
allow third-country nationals to leave Iraq and Kuwait and allow them access to
consular officials; (2) "take no action to jeopardize the safety, security or health"
of those third-country nationals; and (3) withdraw its orders closing diplomatic
and consular missions in Kuwait, reaffirming Resolution 662's declaration that
the annexation of Kuwait is void); S.C. Res. 665 (8/25/90), U.N. SCOR, 2938th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1329 (calling upon
member states deploying naval forces "to use such measures commensurate to
the specific circumstances as may be necessary" to halt shipping in compliance
with the terms of Resolution 661 and to coordinate their actions using, as
appropriate, mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee); S.C. Res. 666
(9/13/90), U.N. SCOR, 2939th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 (1990), reprintedin 29
I.L.M. 1332 (regarding the humanitarian situation in Kuwait and the failure of
Iraq to comply with Resolution 661); S.C. Res. 667 (9/16/90), U.N. SCOR, 2940th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (1990), reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1332 (condemning Iraqi
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aggression against diplomatic personnel and abductions of foreign nationals and
demanding their release and the cessation of all such activities); S.C. Res. 670
(9/25/90), U.N. SCOR, 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (1990), reprintedin 29
I.L.M. 1334 (strengthening the embargo against Iraq set forth in Resolution 661,
threatening sanctions against member states who violate the embargo, and
stating that Iraq is liable under Geneva Convention IV for violations); S.C. Res.
674 (10/29/90), U.N. SCOR, 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990), reprinted
in 29 I.L.M. 1561 (demanding that Iraq cease taking hostages, fulfill its
obligations under Geneva Convention IV, allow third-state nationals to depart
Kuwait, allow Kuwaitis access to food and water, and requesting the SecretaryGeneral to report to the Security Council regarding his efforts to achieve a
peaceful solution); S.C. Res. 677 (11/28/90), U.N. SCOR, 2962d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/667 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1564 (condemning Iraqi attempts to
alter Kuwait's demographic population and the destruction of civil records). On
November 29, 1990, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the
Security Council gave Iraq until January 15, 1991 to comply with previous
resolutions and authorized all member states "to use all necessary means" to
enforce them and restore peace to the area. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg.
at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990). In the
following weeks, UN forces succeeded in removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait. On
March 3, 1991, Iraq accepted a permanent cease-fire that left the Iraqi army and
government intact.
The humanitarian crisis that resulted from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait gained
international attention when, in March 1992, Iraq's military suppressed a
Kurdish uprising in the northern area of Iraq bordering Turkey, forcing huge
numbers of Kurds to flee their villages for the relative safety of the mountains
near the Iraq-Turkey border. Ved P. Nanda, Tragedy in Northern Iraq, Liberia,
Yugoslavia, and Haiti- Revisiting the Validity of HumanitarianIntervention Under
InternationalLaw- Part I, 20 DENV. J. INrIL L. & POLY 305, 330-31 (1992). The
Security Council responded with a resolution declaring the massive displacement
of Iraqi citizens a threat to international peace and security, and demanded that
Iraq cease the military operations against the Kurds and allow international
human rights observers into the area to aid the refugees. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991), reprintedin 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991). The
United States, Great Britain, and France installed troops in safety zones in
northern Iraq, even though the Resolution did not authorize the use of force.
Nancy D. Arnison, InternationalLaw and Non-Intervention: When Do Humanitarian
Concerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199, 204 (1993).
For the first time in the history of the United Nations, threats to international
peace and security were tied to violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights advocates were elated. Id.
As of 1991, the principles of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes
against peace first enunciated at Nuremberg attained the status of peremptory
norms of international law. According to international law, peremptory norms
mandate universal enforcement, jurisdiction, and responsibility because they are
absolutely binding, allowing no form of derogation whatsoever. Beres, Iraqi
Crimes and InternationalLaw, supra, at 338. Proponents argue for instituting
judicial proceedings against alleged Iraqi war criminals because the world
community has the responsibility to enforce violations of the principles first
enunciated at Nuremberg and later codified into international law. Beres,
Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes, supra, at 497-503. Furthermore, judicial proceedings
should occur notwithstanding Iraq's emergence from the war largely unoccupied
and with its government still intact. Id. This argument distinguishes the legal
and geopolitical factors, and requires the international community to use political
and diplomatic persuasion to force the Iraqi government to hand over alleged war
criminals. Professor Beres suggests the possibility of reintroducing military forces
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IV. THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE YUGOSLAV TRIBUNAL
The United Nations responded to the world's outrage over the
carnage in the former Yugoslavia by creating the first war crimes
tribunal since the end of World War II. Almost immediately after
its creation, the Yugoslav Tribunal was criticized as an empty
gesture of the UN Security Council, intended merely as a public
relations ploy.1 5 8 Admittedly, the Tribunal's hasty construction
and complicated role in negotiating a peace settlement may

into Iraq to gain custody of the accused, but concludes that such an action is
"unlikely for both tactical and political reasons." See Beres, Iraqi Crimes and
InternationalLaw, supra,at 350-51. Beres suggests that forcible abduction, trials
in absentia, or assassination of accused war criminals are all proper responses to
war crimes.

Although each response presents different legal questions, Beres

concludes that none is insurmountable. See id. at 351-57.
The United Nations has given no indication, however, that it is willing to move
forward with prosecutions of Iraqis accused of violating humanitarian law, despite
being obligated to do so under international law. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts,
Deportation and Transfer of Civilians in Time of War, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

469, 493 (1993) ("[P]ursuant to Article 146 of Geneva IV, states even have a duty
to prosecute those who commit the grave breaches [of humanitarian law] .... But
whether this will actually take place is not exclusively a matter of law.
International politics will first determine whether the prosecution would be
opportune and practically possible.").
This state of affairs is clearly upsetting to Beres, who argues that "Time is
running outl Saddam Hussein and the surviving members of his Revolutionary
Council, by evading prosecution, would defile justice and leave international law
weak and tragically undermined." Beres, Iraqi Crimes and International Law,
supra, at 336. A major lesson from past international war crimes tribunals is the

necessity of the international community being completely committed to the
prosecution of human rights violations.

AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON THE

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL To ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMIrrED IN THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA 8 (1993) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]. Aside from maintaining an
embargo against Iraq, the United Nations only attempt at punishing the Iraqi

government for their war of aggression was to create a compensation commission
charged with the task of administering a fund intended to pay out reparations for
direct injuries to foreign governments, nationals, and foreign corporations during
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The compensation fund and commission were
established by Resolution 687. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., at 5, 7, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 846 (1991). The Compensation
Commission is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and is comprised of 15
members. The Commission oversees a fund into which Iraq is required to pay up
to 30% of its oil revenues. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1705 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1715 (1991). Because Iraq has not
sold oil on the international market since 1990, the Security Council provided for
the release of Iraqi oil proceeds frozen in banks located in member states until
other funds become available from new oil sales. Henckaerts, supra, at 495.
157. On November 8, 1994, the UN Security Council voted to establish a
war crimes tribunal for Rwanda for crimes committed during that country's 1994
civil war. Richard D. Lyons, U.N. Approves Tribunal in Rwandan Atrocities, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A12.
158. See infranotes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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preclude the effective prosecution of war crimes. The best hope
for the Tribunal is that its very existence will force combatants to
settle for peace. The mere threat of war crimes prosecution may
compel warring parties to cease combat and to relinquish their
spoils of war in exchange for amnesty from prosecution. Rather
than undermining the force and effect of international
humanitarian law, such a result could deter future combatants
from committing war crimes, as the threat of war crimes
prosecution would jeopardize and perhaps outweigh the potential
rewards of armed conflict.
A.

UN Security CouncilActions Leading to Resolution 827

Security Council Resolution 827159 establishes the Yugoslav
War Crimes Tribunal and contains the Statute of the
International Tribunal, which sets forth the Tribunal's structure,
jurisdiction, and procedures. 16 0 The adoption of Resolution 827
represents the culmination of a year-long process of United
Nations fact-finding and deliberation.
After repeated attempts to reach a political settlement failed,
the Security Council became involved in enforcing international
humanitarian law in the Yugoslav conflict. On July 13, 1992, the
Security
Council
passed
Resolution
764,161
declaring
international humanitarian law binding on all warring parties in

the former Yugoslavia and placing responsibility for violations on
individual actors.
Security

Council

One month later, on August 12, 1992, the
unanimously

adopted

Resolution

771,162

16 3

pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

159.

This

U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).

160.
Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., Annex at 36, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
revised by U.N. DOC. S/25704/Corr. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Statute].
161.
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093d mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/764
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 1465 (1992). Resolution 764 emphasized that
"persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the [1949
Geneva] Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such breaches." Id.
Individual responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law is one of
the most important legacies of the Nuremberg trials. The reasoning behind
applying criminal penalties to individuals who commit grave violations of
international humanitarian law is that "such crimes are not committed by
abstract legal entities but rather by individuals whose accountability before the
international community thus strips their action of its purported legitimacy and
makes them liable to punishment by national or international action." M. Cherif
Bassiouni, CrimesAgainst Humanity, supranote 141, 65-66.
162.
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992),
reprintedin 31 I.L.M. at 1470 (1992).
163.
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter is entitled, "Action With
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression."
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resolution calls on states and international human rights

organizations to collect documentation of human rights abuses in

the former Yugoslavia and to forward it to the Council. 164
Resolution 771165 also demanded that all military forces active in
Bosnia-Herzegovina observe humanitarian law and threatened
16 6
further Security Council action to ensure compliance.
Shortly thereafter, the United Nations established a
Commission of Experts to begin collecting data on human rights
The Commission was
violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 1 67
charged with collecting information from international human
rights groups, conducting independent investigations of the data,
and presenting the gathered information to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. 16 8 In response to the Commission's final

Under Chapter VII, the Security Council is given the authority to "determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and
can make recommendations or decide what action is necessary to "maintain or
restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Article 41
provides for the Security Council to employ "measures not involving the use of
armed force" to enforce its decision and, if such measures are ineffectual, Article
42 allows the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Id.
Article 42 was invoked by the Security Council in its resolution authorizing
military action against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. Id. See S.C. Res. 678,
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990), reprinted in
29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990); see also suprapart III.C.
164. This course of events closely paralleled Security Council action taken
nearly two years prior to the conflict with Iraq. See James C. O'Brien, Current

Developments: The InternationalTribunalFor Violation of InternationalHumanitarian
Law in the FonnerYugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INt' L. 639, 641 (1993).
S.C. Res. 771, supra note 162.
165.
166. Id. para.7.
167. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc, S/RES/780
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1476 (1992). The Commission of Experts was
appointed on October 26, 1992, pursuant to a report submitted by the SecretaryGeneral. Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Establishment of the Commission of
Experts Pursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N.
On February 9, 1993, the
SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24657 (1992).
Commission of Experts (Commission) submitted its Interim Report, which
concluded that grave breaches of international humanitarian law had indeed
taken place in the former Yugoslavia; the report stated that "it would be for the
Security Council or another competent organ of the United Nations to establish
[an ad hoc international] tribunal in relation to events in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. The Commission observes that such a decision would be
consistent with the direction of its work." Interim Report of the Commission of
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., at 20, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993).
It has been suggested that the creation of the Commission alone has
168.
prevented some further violations of international humanitarian law. O'Brien,
supra note 149, at 641. For the official history and documents of the World War
II War Crimes Commission, see UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra
note 91; S.C. Res. 780, supranote 167.
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report, 16 9 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
808 on February 22, 1993.170 In that Resolution, the Council
established an international tribunal "for the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991."171 The Resolution further requested the Secretary-General
to submit a report on the implementation of the Yugoslav
Tribunal. 172 The Secretary-General's report contained a proposed
Statute of the Tribunal (Tribunal Statute or Statute), 17 3 which the
Security Council adopted intact in Resolution 827.174
B. The Structure,Procedures,and
TerritorialJurisdictionof the Tribunal
The structure of the Tribunal and its purported power to
supersede the national judicial systems that traditionally
administer laws of war may pose the most significant obstacles to
compelling compliance with the Tribunal's demands. 175
The
Tribunal has jurisdiction over five sovereign states (BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and the new rump
Yugoslavia), all of which must cooperate if the Tribunal is to
function properly.1 7 6 The Tribunal's authority for its jurisdiction
is founded on the widely accepted, modern belief that national
legal systems are subservient to international legal regimes, a
belief not necessarily shared by the combatants. 17 7 Although
national sovereignty should not justify a refusal to surrender
nationals accused of war crimes, attempting both to negotiate
peace and to bring accused war criminals to justice before an
international tribunal may be incompatible goals; sovereign
nations may be reluctant to participate in an international legal

169. The Commission's report did not contain information sufficient for
initiating prosecution of any individuals because it was not intended for such a
purpose. The Commission was fraught with difficulties ranging from inadequate
staffing, funding, and disputes over its mandate. Nevertheless, given that the
report was completed by an independent and impartial body (not human rights
organizations who have an interest in prosecutions), the information it contains
will be more difficult for the international community to dismiss. O'Brien, supra
note 149, at 642.
170.

U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).

171.

Id.

172.
Id. at 2.
173.
Statute, supranote 160.
174.
S.C. Res. 827, supranote 159.
175.
See Alfred P. Rubin, An International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia?, 6 PACEINWLL. REV. 7, 9 (1994).
176. Id.
177.
See Alfred P. Rubin, Enforcing the Rules ofInternationalLaw, 34 HARV.
IN'r'LL.J. 149, 159-60 (1993).
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regime under which an international bureaucracy administers
178
laws of war.
1. Territorial Jurisdiction and Structure of the Tribunal
As an ad hoc body, the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction is
limited in time and location. 179 The Tribunal may prosecute only
crimes that have occurred in the former Yugoslavia since January
1, 1991.180
The structure of the Tribunal consists of three principal
organs: the Chambers, the Prosecutor, and the Registry. 1 8 ' The
Chambers are comprised of two three-member Trial Chambers
and a five-member Appeals Chamber charged with adjudicating

cases.1 8 2 The Prosecutor' 8 3 investigates allegations and prepares

indictments for cases to be prosecuted. 184 The Registry assists
178.
Rubin, InternationalCriminalTribunal supra note 175, at 17.
Statute, supranote 160, art. 1.
179.
180. Id. The Tribunal has jurisdiction over all war crimes and crimes
against humanity that have occurred since January 1, 1991, more than six
months before Slovenia seceded and war broke out. O'Brien, supra note 149, at
645.
181.
Statute, supranote 160, art. 11.
182. Id. art. 12. Article 13 of the Tribunal Statute sets forth the
qualifications of judges and the procedure for electing them. The qualifications
are similar to those required for judges on the International Court of Justice. See
STATUIE OF IE INTERNATIONAL COutRr OF JUSTCE, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, art. 2.
Judges for either tribunal must have "high moral character," a knowledge of
international law, and "the qualifications required in their respective countries for
appointment to the highest judicial offices." The 11 judges were finally elected by
the United Nations General Assembly on September 17, 1993. The judges are:
Georges Michel Abi-Saab (Egypt), Antonio Cassese (Italy), Jules Deschenes
(Canada), Adolphus Godwin Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria), Germain Le Foyer De Costil
(France), Li Haopei (China), Abrielle Kirk McDonald (United States), Elizabeth
Odio Benito (Costa Rica), Rustam S. Sidhwa (Pakistan), Sir Ninian Stephen
(Australia), and Lal Chand Vohrah (Malaysia). Surya Prakash Sinha, Symposium,
Should There Be an International Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity?,
IntroductoryNote, 6 PACE INTL L. REV. 1, 3-4 n.8 (1994); Julia Preston, U.N. Elects
11 Judges for War Crimes Court: Texas Jurist Chosen for Balkans Tribunal,WASH.
PoSr, Sept 18, 1993, at A15.
183.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, who directed the activities of the War Crimes
Commission, was suggested as the Prosecutor, but was not given the position.
He believes Great Britain opposed him. On August 15, 1994, Richard J.
Goldstone took office as the Prosecutor. Wilbur G. Landrey, War Crimes TribunaL"
More Than a FigLeap, ST. PEERSBUIRG TIMES, Sept 4, 1994, at 1A.
184. Id. art. 16. Choosing the Prosecutor was a matter of great difficulty for
the Security Council. Secretary-General Bhoutros-Ghali had proposed to name M.
Cherif Bassiouni as Prosecutor. The European members of the Council opposed

his nomination, however, fearing that he would be biased because he is a Muslim.

See Preston, supra note 182. Ramon Escovar Salom of Venezuela was eventually
named Prosecutor, but then he left to take a position as Interior Minister in the
Venezuelan Cabinet. Gary Regenstreif, Yugoslavia War ProsecutorJoins Venezuela
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both the Prosecutor and the Chambers, in addition to performing
other administrative duties, such as requesting governments to
provide information on the identity of the accused, to serve
documents, and to extradite the accused.185 To enforce the
Tribunal's extradition requests, the Registry must rely on its
power of indictment, the cooperation of concerned governments,
and threatened sanctions by the UN Security Council for failure
to comply.186

Cabinet, Reuters World Service, Jan. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,

Non-US File.
185. Statute, supra note 160, art. 29. The ABA Report recommends that
the Registry be divided and include separate staffs for the Chambers and the
Prosecutor because, as defined in the Statute, there is a potential for a "material
reduction in substantive fairness." The ABA emphasizes that, as a shared body,
the Registry could get caught in a conflict of interest between fulfilling its duties
to the Chambers and to the Prosecutor. Such a conflict undermines the
Registry's impartiality and threatens the rights of the accused. See ABA REPORT,
supra note 156, at 18-19.
It
186. Article 29 is entitled "Cooperation and Judicial Assistance."
provides:
1.
States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the
investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious
violations of international humanitarian law.
2.
States shall comply without undue delay with any request for
assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not
limited to:
(a) the identification and location of persons;
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International
Tribunal.
Obtaining the cooperation of the governments involved in the conflict has been
identified as one of the major problems facing the Tribunal, especially with regard
to Serbia. In order to get cooperation, the United Nations has to proceed very
carefully and use a "judicious combination of incentives on the one hand, and
intimidation on the other.... short of military intervention." Akhavan, supra
note 6, at 281.
Akhavan recommends that the United Nations adopt a
"'hierarchical approach' towards the prosecution of war criminals; prosecution
could begin with lower-ranking officials and gradually work upwards to the higher
echelons of the political leadership." Id. at 282.
The Tribunal is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, which is charged
with the enforcement of the decisions of the Tribunal. Madeleine Albright, the
United States Ambassador to the United Nations, has stated that the end of
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro depends on their cooperation with the
Tribunal and that the United States "will not support easing or lifting sanctions by
the Security Council if, for example, Serb elements obstruct that work [of the
Tribunal]." Cooperationon War Crimes Necessary for Lifing of Sanctions, Agence
France Presse, Jan. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.

1995]

YUGOSLAV WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

2. Procedures of the Tribunal
The Tribunal retains concurrent jurisdiction with the national
courts of states that have emerged from the SFRY since its
collapse. 18 7 While individual states may try a person accused of
war crimes under their own law, the Tribunal has the power to
declare a national judicial proceeding null and void and to
institute an independent trial. 8 8s In practice, this power may
place accused war criminals in double jeopardy if they have been
tried and acquitted by national courts. The Tribunal Statute
provides that if the Tribunal determines that the national court
proceedings were flawed, the accused may be retried before the
Tribunal.1 8 9 Thus, the Tribunal Statute grants the Tribunal the
unprecedented power to render a national judicial process
invalid. 190
Before trying an accused war criminal, however, the Tribunal
must obtain physical custody of the defendant-Article 210 of the
Tribunal Statute prohibits trials in absentia.19 1 The Statute of the
Tribunal contains no provisions for obtaining custody of the
187. Statute, supranote 160, art. 8.
188. Id. arts. 9-10. Article 9 gives the Tribunal primacy over national
courts. Under Article 10, which codifies the principle of non bis in idem (not twice
for the same thing), the Tribunal may try a person who was tried by the national
courts for the same acts, but not for the same offense. Conversely, Article 10
further provides that national courts may not try an individual who has already
been brought before the Tribunal. These provisions are intended to prevent the
repetition of events that occurred after World War I, when the Germans tried their
own war criminals at Leipzig and imposed light sentences. Statute, supra note
160, art. 10(2)(b).
189.
Statute, supranote 160, art. 10(2)(b).
190.
See Greenwood, supranote 148, at 654.
191. The prohibition against trials in absentiacontained in Article 210(4)(d)
"represents a substantial advance in this regard over the Nuremberg
proceedings," which allowed for trials without the defendant present and
convicted Martin Bormann in absentia. O!Brien, supra note 149, at 656. As
noted by the Secretary-General in his report, this prohibition is also required by
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368, 373
(1967). The Tribunal has decided, however, to make public the evidence of war
crimes committed by accused individuals who are not before the Tribunal. Sabine
Gillot, Tribunal Wdl Reveal War Crimes Evidence Against Absent Defendants,
Agence France Presse, Feb. 11, 1994 available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US
File.
The argument against in absentia trials emphasizes the need to ensure that
due process requirements are met and to avoid the "smell of show trials." Public
statements on indictments also diminish the need for in absentiatrials because
media coverage may encourage governments who have custody over accused
individuals to surrender them. In addition, ff trials are conducted in absentia,
later proceedings may illuminate procedural irregularities, resulting in acquittals.
See O'Brien, supranote 149, at 656-57.
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accused;19 2 it relies solely on the cooperation of the combatants.
The Secretary-General's report indicates that "it is axiomatic that
the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally
193
recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused,"
apparently addressing concerns such as the possibility that
United Nations personnel may abduct accused individuals and
deliver them to the Tribunal. 194
Although these provisions safeguard the rights of the
accused, they may substantially impair the Tribunal's ability to
try war criminals. 195 If an accused war criminal remains in a
powerful position in his government, it will be virtually impossible
for the Tribunal to gain custody of the defendant. Thus, because
the Tribunal Statute is based on the Nuremberg model, which
provides for the prosecution of leaders of a defeated nation, only
or third parties are likely
persons in the custody of their enemies
19 6
candidates for war crimes trials.

192.

Statute, supranote 160, art. 21. Article 20 provides in pertinent part:

The trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious
1.
and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of
procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and
due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.
2.
A person against whom an indictment has been confirmed shall,
pursuant to an order or an arrest warrant of the International Tribunal, be
taken into custody, immediately informed of the charges against him and
transferred to the International Tribunal.
193. Secretary-General'sReport, supranote 141, para. 106.
194. This issue recently received great international attention in the wake of
the abduction of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain by U.S. agents in Mexico and his
return to the United States to stand trial as an accessory to the murder of a U.S.

DEA agent. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). While
the majority approved of the abduction while construing the United States-Mexico
Extradition Treaty, it acknowledged that extraterritorial abduction might violate
customary international law. Id. at 2196. For an example of the concern that
extraterritorial law enforcement actions have generated, see Eric Bentley, Toward
an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Extraterritorial Searches and
Seizures Abroad AfterVerdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 329 (1994).
195. Susan Moran, Jury is Out on Bosnia War Crimes TribunaL"Doubts Over
Ability to Try Those Who Have Committed Atrocities, INSIGHT, August 30, 1993, at
12. Moran argues that extraditing Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic is next to impossible because of their
stronghold on power and the United Nations lack of enforcement mechanisms to
gain access to the necessary documents. Because extradition is voluntary, Moran
reports that the Croats will refuse to extradite any of their nationals accused of
crimes by the Tribunal if the Serbs refuse first. Cf. Graham Barrett, Netherlands:
Doubts Cloud War Crime Court, Reuter Textline, Nov. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Alwld File ("A number of international legal experts are already
deriding the idea that any of the big suspects will end up on trial, saying that
none of them is likely to volunteer to attend [proceedings before the Tribunal] and
that the former Yugoslav republics would not allow them to be extradited.").
196. Rubin, supra note 175, at 9.
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Once a defendant is in custody, the Tribunal Statute offers
only procedural protections for the rights of the defendant, some
of which are granted at the discretion of the Chambers. For
example, the Statute provides for defense counsel if the Chambers
decides "the interests of justice so require." 19 7 To ensure greater
protections for defendants, the American Bar Association (ABA)
has recommended that the UN Security Council amend the
Statute to provide for an Office of Defense Counsel, which would

aenhance the adversarial nature of the Tribunal." 198 According to
the ABA, the Office of Defense Counsel would function in a
manner similar to that of a public defender's office in the United
States, which accepts "the representation of the first defendant
19 9
'through the door'."
If the Tribunal finds an individual guilty of war crimes, it may
sentence him. 20° The convicted party will serve his sentence in
the prison of a state that has declared a willingness to accept
such convicts.2 0 1 The law of the state of incarceration applies to
the conditions of imprisonment and parole; 2 °2 however, if the
convict becomes eligible for parole under the law of the state of
incarceration, the President of the Tribunal must consult with the
Tribunal judges and make a final decision on whether to approve
or deny the parole "on the
basis of the interests of justice and
203
general principles of law."

C. Subject Matter Jurisdictionof the Tribunal

The Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction is established by
the rules of international humanitarian law codified in the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949 (Geneva
Convention I), 2 0 4 the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention IV),205 the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
197.

Statute, supranote 160, art. 21(4)(d).

198.

ABA REPORT, supranote 156, at 20.

199.

Id.

200.
Once convicted, a person may be sentenced to prison and/or required
to "return any of the property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct."

Statute, supranote 160, art. 24(3).
201. Id. art. 27. As of this writing, no states have consented to the use of
their prison facilities.
202.
Id.
203. Id- art. 28.

204.
art. 2.
205.

art. 3.

Geneva Convention (1), supra note 77. See Statute, supra note 160,
Hague Convention (IV), supra note 77.

See Statute, supra note 160,
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Genocide (Genocide Convention),20 and the Charter of the
International Military TribunalYT The Secretary-General's report
declares that international humanitarian law as it "exists in the
form of both conventional law and customary law"20 8 operates as
the Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction. Under the Tribunal
Statute, "international humanitarian law" covers three specific
areas: armed conflict, genocide, and crimes against humanity. 20 9
Articles 2 through 5 define the competence of the Tribunal as jus
cogens international humanitarian law in order to avoid the
10
problems of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law).2

Nevertheless, significant gaps exist that may create problems
211

related to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege
Articles 2 through 5 of the Tribunal's Statute set forth the
principal mandate of the Tribunal-to criminalize the policy of
"ethnic cleansing."2 12 Article 2, entitled "Grave Breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949,"213 embodies "the core of the
2 14
customary law applicable in international armed conflicts."
Article 2 provides:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute
persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following
acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of
the relevant Geneva Convention:
(a) willful killing;
(b)
torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments
(c)
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health;
(d)
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by the military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly;

206. Genocide Convention, supra note 77. See Statute, supra note 160,
art. 4.
207. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 137. See Statute, supra note 160, art.
5. Because these conventions may apply concurrently, one act may constitute
separate crimes, and the accused may be prosecuted more than once before the

Tribunal. Such multiple prosecutions are possible because war crimes and
crimes against humanity overlap.
208. Secretary-General'sReport, supranote 141, para. 33.
209. Greenwood, supranote 148, at 644. See also Statute, supranote 160,
arts. 2-5.
210. Statute, supranote 160, arts. 2-5.
211. See generally ABA REPORT, supra note 156, at 11-16 (discussing the
law to be applied by the Tribunal).
212. S.C. Res. 827, supranote 159.
213. Statute, supra note 160, art. 2.
214. Secretary-General'sRepor, supranote 141, para. 37.
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(e)
compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the
forces of a hostile power;
(f)
wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights
of a fair and regular trial;
(g)
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of
a civilian;
2 15
(h) taking civilians as hostages.

Article 2 applies only to "grave breaches"2 16 against persons or
property protected by the Geneva Conventions, and imposes three
additional requirements: (1) the violation must occur during an
international armed conflict; (2) the defendant must be connected
to a party involved in the conflict; and (3) the victim must be a
21 7
protected person under one of the Conventions.
Article 2 of the Statute of the Tribunal contains a substantial
loophole that may undermine the applicability of international
humanitarian law to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
Although the SFRY and all of its successor states are parties to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 18 Article 2 may not apply to the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia if the conflict is deemed internal,

as opposed to international, and therefore not subject to the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 2 19

If the conflict is

characterized as internal, an accused war criminal appearing

before the Tribunal theoretically could defend his prosecution by

215. Statute, supra note 160, art. 2.
216. For example, Article 147 of Geneva Convention (IV) defines "grave
breaches" as:
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property
protected by the present Convention: willful killing, torture or inhumane
treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a
protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or willfully
depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed in the present Convention, taling of hostages and extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Geneva Convention (IV), supranote 77, art. 147.
217. Greenwood, supra note 148, at 650.
218. 1&Lat 647-48. Customary international law generally provides that
successor states are parties to the conventions to which the mother state was a
party. Accordingly, Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia have all made declarations of
accession to the treaty obligations of the SFRY. Id. at 648.
219. Id. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has elements of both
international and internal conflicts.. Id. at 648-49. See also O'Brien, supra note
149, at 647.
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arguing that his actions were not subject to the rules of
2 20

international warfare.
Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal addresses this
potential loophole by broadening the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. 2 2 1 Article 3, entitled "Violations of the Laws or Customs
of War," codifies the laws of war set forth in the 1907 Hague
Convention (IV),2 22 which are unquestionably part of customary
international law.2 23 Article 3 provides:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute
persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to:
(a)
employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
(b)
not justified by military necessity;
attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended
(c)
towns, villages, dwellings or other buildings;
seizure of, or destruction or wilful damage done to
(d)

institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts
and sciences, historic monuments and works of art or science;
(e)
plunder of public or private property.

This article is extremely broad, primarily because the term "shall
include, but not be limited to" expands the scope of the article
beyond the specifically listed violations.
The broad scope of Article 3 was intended to expand the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal beyond the grave
breaches listed in Article 2.224 However, the breadth of Article 3
raises the specter of nullum crimen sine lege and may effectively
limit the article's application. If a defendant's act does not rise to
the level of a grave breach within the meaning of Article 2, the
Tribunal may try to prosecute the act under the broader
provisions of Article 3. However, an act that does not constitute a

220.
See O'Brien, supra note 149, at 647.
This issue was debated by the Security Council before issuing
221.
Resolution 827. The members of the Council recognized the fact that, if the
conflict were to be characterized as internal rather than international, the Geneva
Conventions would not apply, and the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction over
the crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the scene of the worst atrocities.
Greenwood, supranote 148, at 650-51.
222.
Hague Convention IV, supranote 77.
223. This convention was intended for use in the planned post-World War I
war crimes trials and was used at Nuremberg and Tokyo. In fact, the Nuremberg
Tribunal held that the 1907 Hague Convention was part of international law.
Walter G. Sharp, The Effective Deterrence of EnvironmentalDamage During Armed
Conflict A CaseAnalysis of the PersianGulf War, 137 MIL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1992).
224. In the Security Council debate on Resolution 827, the United States,
France, and Great Britain maintained that to cover crimes outside the scope of
Article 2 of the Tribunal Statute, Article 3 of the Statute specifically included
violations listed in Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I.
Greenwood, supranote 148, at 650 n.33.
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grave breach under Article 2 of the Tribunal Statute, and is not
specifically listed under Article 3, might not be subject to
prosecution because it is not sufficiently established as a war
22 5
crime under international law.
After reviewing Article 3 of the Tribunal's Statute, the
American Bar Association proposed amendments to solve this
problem by adding violations specified in Article 23 of the Hague
Regulations.2 26 These additional violations mirror the violations
of the Geneva Conventions listed in Article 2 of the Statute,
thereby eliminating the jurisdictional loophole that may arise if a
defendant argues that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes not specifically listed in Article 3 of the Tribunal
22 7
Statute.
The prosecution of individuals charged with acts of genocide
is the most problematic aspect of the Tribunal's subject matter

jurisdiction. Article 4 provides for the prosecution of acts of
genocide as set forth in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide
Convention).2 28 The Genocide Convention represents the only

codification of crimes against humanity since Nuremberg, 22 9 and
it has never been enforced because of conceptual imprecision in

225.

This possibility arises because the use of the phrase "but not limited

to" extends the application of Article 3 of the Statute to breaches of the Geneva
Conventions that are not characterized as "grave breaches," and any other
relevant customary international law regarding the conduct of war which is vague.
Therefore, interfering with humanitarian aid may constitute a breach of Article 3.
O'Brien, supra note 149, at 646-47. United States Ambassador to the United
Nations, Madeleine Albright, has said that the United States considers any
interference with the delivery of humanitarian aid to be a war crime. David B.
Ottoway, U.S. Warns Serbia on War Trials,WASH. POSr, Jan. 16, 1994, at A19.
226. ABA REPORT, supranote 156, at 13-14. The ABA would amend article
3 to read:
(i)
filling or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army;
(g) killing or wounding an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or
having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;
(h) declaring that no quarter will be given;
(i)
making improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the
military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive
badges of the Red Cross or Red Crescent;
(j)
declaring abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the
rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party.
Id. at 14.
227. Id at 15.
228. Statute, supra note 160, art. 4.
229. Bassiouni, Nuremberg: Forty Years Later, supranote 26, at 8. See also
Webb, supra note 29, at 391-92.
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its substantive articles and weak enforcement provisions. 23 0
Article 4(2) of the Tribunal Statute, taken directly from Article 2 of
the Genocide Convention, provides:
Genocide means only of the following acts committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of a group;
(b)
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c)
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d)
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e)
forcibly
transferring children of the group to another
231
group.

Article 4(3) further provides that the related acts of "conspiracy to
commit genocide," "direct and public incitement to commit
genocide," "attempt to commit genocide," and "complicity in
23 2
genocide" are punishable.
Under Article 4, for an act to qualify as an act of genocide,
(1) the victim or victims were
the prosecution must show:
members of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group;2 aa (2) the
defendants intended to destroy that group, either completely or in
part; and (3) the defendants committed acts in furtherance of that
intent to annihilate the victim group. 2 34 Although the drafters of
the Genocide Convention intended to cover "crimes against
humanity" as defined by the Nuremberg Charter, 23 5 the
Convention does not encompass the extermination of social or
political groups. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention does not
require the existence of war as a prerequisite, nor does it allow for
the prosecution of killing on a massive scale without the requisite
23 6
intent.

230. The Genocide Convention is very imprecise and has weak enforcement
provisions. Its status in international law is questionable, even though all parties
to the war in the former Yugoslavia are parties to this Convention. Bassiouni,
Nuremberg: Forty Years Later, supra note 26, at 8. See also Webb, supra note 29,
at 387-89. Secretary-General'sReport, supranote 141, para. 45. But see Meron,
supra note 8, at 131 (the prohibition against genocide is binding on all states
regardless of the existence of a convention).
231. Statute, supranote 160, art. 4, para. 2.
232.
d. art 4, para. 3.
233. Presumably the victim's national, ethnic, racial, or religious group is
different from that of the accused.
234. Webb, supranote 29, at 390-93.
235. See supranote 140.
236. Bassiouni, Nuremberg: Forty Years Later, supranote 26, at 8. See also
Webb, supranote 29, at 391-92.
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The Tribunal has yet to resolve whether "ethnic cleansing"
constitutes genocide within the meaning of the Genocide
Convention. 2 37 The Genocide Convention endorses the idea of
individual responsibility, 2 38 and also includes a provision
23 9
recognizing the jurisdiction of an international legal tribunal.
The International Court of Justice has recognized a grave risk of
genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but has issued only preliminary
relief, enjoining Yugoslavia from committing or encouraging acts
24
of genocide. 0
Article 5 of the Tribunal's Statute is a catch-all provision
designed to close any gaps created by judicial interpretation of
Articles 2, 3, and 4. Article 5 grants the Tribunal the authority to
prosecute crimes against humanity. 24 1 Acts constituting crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide are very similar,
differing only in terms of the context in which the acts are
committed. 242 Article 5 provides:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute
persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and
directed against any civilian population:

(a)

murder;

(b)

extermination;

(c)

enslavement;

(d)
(e)
()
(g)
(h)

deportation;
imprisonment;
torture;
rape;
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds;

237.
See generallyWebb, supranote 29 (discussing the interpretation of the
Genocide Convention).
238.
Genocide Convention, supranote 77, art. 4.
239.
The International Court of Justice cannot hear claims against
individuals, and absent an international tribunal, individuals accused of genocide
may only be tried in national courts. Id. See also Webb, supra note 29, at 39394.
240.
International Court of Justice (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo.) (Order
on request for the indication of provisional measures), para. 52, reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 888, 901 (1993).
241. The definition of crimes against humanity used in Article 5 comes
directly from Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany. The definition
derived from Law No. 10 is much broader than the definition set forth in the
Nuremberg Charter. Allied Control Council No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, reprinted in 3
INERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENr, supra note 118, at 129.
UNTIED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supranote 91, 212-15. Cf. supra note 140, for
the definition of crimes against humanity used in the Nuremberg Charter.
242.
"[G]enocide is different from crimes against humanity in that, to prove
it, no connection with war need be shown, and, on the other hand, genocide is
aimed against groups, whereas crimes against humanity do not necessarily
involve offenses against or persecutions of groups." Akhavan, supra note 6, at
277 (citation omitted).
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(i)

other inhumane acts.

This definition of crimes against humanity is similar to common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 2 43 Article 5 of the Tribunal
Statute was designed specifically in response to "ethnic
cleansing," subjecting the practice to prosecution regardless of
2
whether the conflict is deemed international or internal. "
Although the Secretary-General intended the article to be broad,
Article 5 is actually more restrictive than the previous four
articles, as it covers only attacks against civilian populations-not
individual civilians-that are "committed as part of a widespread
on national,
or systematic attack against any civilian population
2 5
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." "
The inclusion of "other inhumane acts" in Article 5(i)
2
indicates that the list of crimes in Article 5 is not exhaustive. 46
As with Article 3, this rather open-ended and undefined provision
makes the Yugoslav Tribunal vulnerable to charges of violating
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.24 7 The Secretary-General
attempted to clarify Article 5(i) by relying on the International
Court of Justice opinion that common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions is "a minimum yardstick" that "reflect[s] what the
Court in 1949 called 'elementary considerations of humanity,'
considerations that have arguably changed in the intervening
years. 248
These elementary considerations of humanity are
indeed broad and possibly subject to dispute because they stem
from "the useages [sic] established among civilized peoples, 49from
2
the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience."
The ABA recommended amending Article 5 to clarify which
acts constitute crimes against humanity and to insulate the
Yugoslav Tribunal from criticisms of violating the doctrine of
nullum crimen sine lege.25 0 The ABA urged the Security Council

243. Secretary-General'sReport, supranote 141, at 13.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Statute, supra note 160, art. 5(i).
247. ABA REPORT, supranote 156, at 14.
248. Military and Parliamentary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27), reprintedin 25 l.L.M. 1023, 1073 (1986).
249. Id. (quoting Geneva Convention I, art. 63; Convention II, art. 62;
Convention Ill, art. 142; and Convention IV, art. 158).
250. ABA REPORT, supranote 156, at 15. According to the ABA Task Force,
Article 5(a) through (e) should remain the same, but the rest of the Article should
be amended. Their proposal would read (changes in italics):
(I) torture and mutilation;
(g) rape, including enforced prostitution and enforced pregnancy, and
otherforrnsofsexual assault,
(h) persecution on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i)
taking of hostages;
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to expand subparagraph (g) to cover forced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, and other "widespread sexual abuses."2 5 1 In addition,
the ABA suggested replacing subparagraph (i) with crimes listed
in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions-crimes that are
not listed in Article 5, subparagraphs (a) through (h) of the
Tribunal Statute. By replacing subparagraph (i), the ABA hoped
to close most of the gaps and to ensure that the additional crimes
are within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, in the event that the
25 2
conflict is deemed internal and Article 2 becomes inapplicable.
In the final analysis, the subject matter jurisdiction of the

Tribunal may sufficiently provide for alternate and multiple

means of prosecuting atrocities committed under the policy of
ethnic cleansing. 2 -s

Despite several problems

stemming from

ambiguous terminology and the lack of judicial interpretation of

the instruments on which Articles 2 through 5 are based, the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal stands on a finm legal
foundation. 2 54 The Tribunal appears relatively immune from
critics' claims that its subject matter jurisdiction violates the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege. Although applying the
provisions of these four articles in actual cases will require a
certain degree of judicial activism, the strength of international

(j)
outrages uponpersonal dignity, in particularhumiliating and degrading
treatment
(k) passing of sentence and the caringout of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
Id. at 15-16. Interestingly, in the attempt to clarify crimes against humanity in
the Statute, the ABA's recommendations are almost as unclear as the original
.other inhumane acts" language.
251. Id. at 15.
252. Id. Remember, Article 2 only applies to grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions committed in international armed conflict. The Secretary-General
and the ABA Task Force agree that it should not matter whether the conflict is
internal or international for crimes against humanity to be prosecuted. There is
also support for the position that crimes against humanity do not even require
the precondition of armed conflict. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J.
2537 (1991). On the other hand, the lack of judicial interpretation of crimes
against humanity since the end of World War II requires the Statute of the
Tribunal to be very precise to avoid having a case thrown out on a technicality of

treaty interpretation.
253.
Greenwood, supra note 148, at 651-52. Greenwood points out that
.ethnic cleansing involves acts which would fall within all four categories covered
by the statute, i.e. the killing, torture or deportation of protected persons (Article
2), the plunder of private property (Article 3), most of the actions which amount to
genocide (Article 4), and most, if not all, of those falling within the definition of
crimes against humanity (Article 5)." Id. at 652.
254. Id.
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humanitarian law stands to be reinforced regardless of the
outcome of this experiment.

V. HARD CHOICES: THE AGENDA FOR PEACE,
PEACEKEEPING, AND PEACEMAKING

According to the UN Charter, the primary objective of the
United Nations is to "maintain international peace and
security," 2 55 including the promotion of "universal respect for,

and observance of, human rights."25 6 Nevertheless, despite the
comprehensive body of international law governing warfare and
human rights developed since the inception of the United Nations,
approximately one hundred armed conflicts have occurred since
1945.257 In addition, because UN member states often fail 2 5to8
fulfill their affirmative duty to comply with international law,
critics have accused the United Nations of failing to hold
international actors accountable for violations of human rights
and the laws of war.2 S9 In light of its history of not compelling
compliance with the international human rights regime, two
simultaneous tasks lie before the United Nations with respect to
the war in the former Yugoslavia:
(1) enforcing international
humanitarian law, and (2) maintaining peace through the
peacemaking and peacekeeping processes. 2 60 The primary issue
facing the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia is whether
26 1
these objectives are compatible or mutually exclusive.
The end of the Cold War, 2 6 2 at least in theory, has provided
the Security Council with an opportunity to establish firmly in

255. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
256. Id. art. 55(c).
257. Hans-Peter Gasser, Ensuring Respect for the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols: The Role of Third States and the United Nations, in 2 EFFECIING
COMPLIANCE 15, 16 n.3 (Hazel Fox & Michael A. Meyer eds., 1993).
258. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.

259. But see Gasser, supra note 257, at 37-39. Gasser asserts that during
the Gulf Conflict the Security Council was "slow in recognising its function as one
of the agents mandated to promote respect for international humanitarian law by
the parties to the conflict," but nevertheless applied "humanitarian law
throughout without naming it." Id. at 38.
260. Id. at 17.
261. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht once wrote, "if international law is, in some
ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more
conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law." Id. at 14 n.4 (quoting
H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRrT. Y.B. INrL
L. 360,382 (1962)).
262. The "new world order" is characterized by two countervailing trends:
(1) increased instability caused by the "vigorous renaissance" of the concept of
sovereign nation-states; and (2) creation of new and reinforcement of old
international institutions to create international political stability. See Jost

19951

YUGOSLAV WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

2
international law the laws of war and human rights. 6
Nevertheless, negotiating a peaceful settlement in the former
Yugoslavia may require foregoing the prosecution of important
war criminals for violations of international humanitarian law in
order to satisfy the international community's desire for a quick,
diplomatic settlement. 2 6 Arguably, the United Nations may be
able to use the Yugoslav Tribunal as a tool to establish a peaceful
settlement and simultaneously to discourage future combatants

from engaging in war crimes.2 6 5 Such an effort would further
integrate the international human rights regime into international
law by indicating to potential combatants that the international
community is at least willing to consider enforcing the laws of war
and human rights, thereby making violations of those laws
2 66
potentially very costly.
In post-Cold War years, the Security Council has evolved into
an effective tool for enforcing international law.2 67 The Security
Council has four key functions in maintaining international peace
and security: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping,
and peace-building.2 68 The UN Secretary-General's vision of the
post-Cold War United Nations includes a particularly dominant
role for the United Nations, and the Yugoslav Tribunal2 6 9 in

Delbruck, A More Effective International Law or a New "World Law"?-Some
Aspects of the Development of InternationalLaw in a Changing InternationalSystem,
68 IND. L.J. 705 (1993).
See, e.g., id. Along with many others, Delbruck argues that "[t]he rigid
263.
bi-polar power structure which stabilized the international system for over forty
years, but at the same time allowed for little flexibility in the conduct of
international relations, has given way to an open, and to some extent, unstable
political setting.' Id. at 705. This instability has provided an opening for the
United Nations to act in new ways and perhaps to fulfill the dreams of its
founders: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, . . . to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights... and to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained...." U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
Great Britain, for instance, reportedly attempted to prevent the
264.

investigation of allegations of war crimes because it interfered with "the overriding
objective' of "keep[ing] the diplomatic game going." Roy Gutman, BBC: Britain
Blocked Bosnia Crime Tribunal,NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 1993, at 6.
D'Amato, supra note 10, at 501.
265.
Joyner, supranote 4, at 272-73.
266.
See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the
267.
Security Council, 87 AM. J. INTL L. 552, 553 (1993). The UN has established over
An Agenda for Peace: Preventative
26 peacekeeping operations since 1945.
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, Report of the Secretary-General,U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., para. 15, U.N. Doc. S/24111 (1992), reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 953,
958-59 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda for Peace].
268. Agenda for Peace, supranote 267, at paras. 46-47.
In the post-Cold War era, "the greatest risks of starting future wars will
269.
likely be those associated with ethnic disputes and the new nationalism that

166

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 28:119

peacekeeping and peace-building. 2 7 0
The Secretary-General
defines peacekeeping as "the deployment of a United Nations
presence in the field, . . . normally involving United Nations
military and/or police personnel."2 7 1
This conception of

peacekeeping indicates that the United Nations is prepared to

impose or make peace272 by "bring[ing] hostile parties to
agreement" under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. 2 73 Once warring

parties have come to a peace agreement, the United Nations is to
begin its function of "post-conflict peace-building." 27 4
In the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations failed to engage
in preventive diplomacy, 2 75 and it must now focus on making,
keeping, and building peace. The United Nations peacekeeping
mission in the Yugoslav conflict was to include facilitating peace
negotiations, delivering humanitarian assistance, protecting
civilian populations, and promising future judicial action. 2 76

seems to be increasing in many areas-motivations that have been historically
associated with human rights violations." John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter,
InternationalLaw and Institutionsfor a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 555 (1993).
As such ethnic and nationalistic tensions are not easily resolved, international
institutions and international law "are able to play only a part in their practical
resolution." Id. at 556. In this sense, the Tribunal is definitely part of a UNbrokered political solution to the problems in the former Yugoslavia. For an
example of the further use of war crimes trials as part of the peace process, see
the discussion of constituting a tribunal for Rwanda. See supra note 157.
270.
See, e.g., Meron, supranote 8, at 122-23.
271. Agenda forPeace, supranote 267, para. 20.
272. W. Michael Reisman, Peacemaking, 18 YALEJ. INT'LL. 415, 416 (1993).
273. Agenda for Peace, supra note 267, para. 20. The first means of
peacemaking, according to the Secretary-General's report, is to send disputes to
the International Court of Justice and to encourage all states to take its
jurisdictional pledge by the year 2000. Id. para. 39(a). Reisman remarks that
"[t]his is nice but not a very realistic aspiration and it is hardly the stuff to
quicken one's pulse. Moreover, it has little to do with peacemaking. Even after
the Court delivered a hypothetical judgment, peacemaking could still be
required." Reisman, supranote 272.
274.
Examples of peace-building are given in the Secretary-General's report.
This process includes "rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations
tom by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among
nations formerly at war." Agenda for Peace, supra note 267, para. 15. This
process is currently underway in Somalia and has been severely criticized.
275.
See, e.g., Meron, supra note 8, at 122-23 ("[T]he Security Council's
decision to establish a war crimes tribunal reflects the failure of the Security
Council's primary mission to end the conflict and atrocities.").
276.
See Report on First Session of International Tribunalfor War Crimes in
Former Yugoslavia, Federal News Service, United Nations Package, Dec. 27, 1993,
availablein LEXIS, News Library. The Security Council's effectiveness in creating
successful peacekeeping operations in regional conflicts depends on several
factors, including the degree to which the permanent members can divorce their
national interests from the problem at hand and provide unwavering diplomatic
support for any peace plan to which its members agree. Secretary-GeneralPdres
de Cud1lar's 1988 Report on the Work of the Organization, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND AJUSTWORLD ORDER 504, 513 (Peter Falk et al. eds., 1991).
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Until the recent NATO activity enforcing the Security Council's
Resolution to help civilian populations, 2 77 the United Nations has
failed with regard to all of the above.2 78 The United Nations

failure may be due to its reluctance to involve itself in the
Yugoslav conflict. The United Nations appears to be waiting for

the conflict to subside before it will take forceful, affirmative
action to stop the fighting;2 7 9 the United Nations intervention will
inevitably come too late to prevent massive suffering in the former

SFRY. 280 The United Nations limited action has therefore been
criticized as nothing more than a scheme by which the
its collective
ease
to
hopes
community
international
281
conscience.
The United Nations peacemaking efforts in the former
Yugoslavia have fared no better than its attempt at
peacekeeping.2 8 2 The Secretary-General attributes the failure of
the peacemaking effort to a "lack of political will of parties to seek
a solution" under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, and
the "indifference of the international community to a problem, or
the marginalization of it."2 8 3 The Secretary-General's analysis,
however, ignores the crucial tripartite relationship among the
United Nations, international politics, and the local politics of
member states.
Although local politics in particular have stymied past and
present peacemaking attempts, 28 4 the success of any United
Nations attempt to make and build peace in the former Yugoslavia
depends foremost on the perceived legitimacy of the Security

See Michael Gordon, Conflict in the Balkans; NATO Craft Down 4 Serb
277.
WarplanesAttacking Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 1994, at Al.
E.g., Boris Johnson, Busy Doing Nothing While Bosnia Bleeds, SUNDAY
278.
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 30, 1994, at 19, available in LEXIS, News Library (discussing
disagreement among the United States, France, and Great Britain on appropriate
action in Bosnia).
279. William J. Durch, Introduction, in THE EVOLUlON OF UNITED NATIONS

PEACEKEEPING 7

(William J. Durch ed., 1993).

280.
See King, supranote 1, at 349 (chiding the United Nations for failing to
engage in preventive diplomacy and leaving it to the European Community
instead).
281. E.g., Terry Atlas, Atrocity Docket; UN has done Little to Prosecute Villains
in Bosnia, CI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 1994, at C1.
See Reisman, supranote 272, at 417. Overshadowed by the Cold War,
282.
the establishment of the United Nations marked "almost revolutionary change" in
international law because, for the first time, the use of force was "centralized...
to the extent that military enforcement measures may be applied only under the
authority of the UN Security Council" or under Article 51 (self-defense). Delbruck,
supranote 262, at 721.
283. Agenda for Peace,supranote 267, para. 41.
284. Reisman, supranote 272.
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Council in the eyes of the world. 28 s The Security Council clearly
has the authority to establish ad hoc judicial bodies such as the
Yugoslav Tribunal, 28 6 and failure to use that authority may
28 7
jeopardize its integrity.
Of course, blind adherence to the objectives of the Tribunal
must not be permitted to undermine the peace process in the
former Yugoslavia. If a peace settlement includes terms for the
Tribunal that are unacceptable to any party for any reason, the
war in the SFRY could be prolonged unnecessarily. Moreover, if
war crimes trials are indeed included as part of a final settlement,
the United Nations may be wise to abandon prosecution, much as
the Allies did after World War I, if war crimes trials stand to
imperil future peacekeeping and peace-building efforts. Thus, the
Tribunal must serve as an integral part of any peace negotiation
and ensure that later prosecutions are viewed as just by the
combatants, thereby reinforcing the Security Council's role in
28 8
ending wars of aggression.
Although the Yugoslav Tribunal began as a means of
providing humanitarian relief, because of the "obvious
incongruence between pursuing a political settlement option and
a justice option,"2 8 9 politicization of the Tribunal may represent a
significant danger to the successful prosecution of alleged war
criminals.2 90
Looking ahead to future tribunals, the
establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal represents a willingness
on the part of the Security Council to go beyond merely
promulgating resolutions, economic sanctions, and actively
providing humanitarian relief,2 9 1 and instead actually to enforce
peace through international humanitarian law. The effectiveness
of the Tribunal, however, ultimately depends on the political

285. Caron, supranote 267, at 554.
286. See ABA REPORT, supra note 156, at 9-11; Secretary-General'sReport,
supra note 141, paras. 18-30. Under Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security

Council has the power to decide how to maintain international peace and security
using the enforcement measures listed in Article 41 of the UN Charter. Because
the methods listed in Article 41 are not exclusive and do not include entities such
as the Tribunal, past Security Council practices and the exigencies of the
situation in the former Yugoslavia are sufficient legal bases for the establishment
of the Tribunal.
287. Caron, supranote 267, at 560-61.
288. Akhavan, supra note 6, at 283-89.
289. M. Cherif Bassiouni, quoted in Gary J. Bass, CourtingDisaster:The U.N.
Goes Soft on Bosnia Again, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 1993, at 13.
290. See, e.g., O'Brien, supranote 149, at 659.
291. But see Lucia Mouat, Rights Groups to UN Troops: Police Thyself,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 27, 1994, at 6. UN troops charged with
delivering humanitarian relief have themselves been the subject of complaints
regarding their alleged use of brothels populated by Croatian and Moslem
prisoners, and profiteering on the black market. A United Nations probe is
currently underway.
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situation in which it operates and on the firm commitment of the

2
members of the Security Council. 9

In 1943, just prior to the establishment of the United
Nations, United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull envisioned

an international body that would "sanitize and order world

politics" so that "there will no longer be any need for spheres of
influence, for alliances, for balances of power.., by which in the
unhappy past the nations strove to safeguard their security or to
promote their interests."2 9 3 In such a world, the United Nations
makes international peace and multilateral action under its
auspices and, independent of the interests of the great powers,
maintains this peace. 2 94 According to Hull, multilateral action
to implant democracy
has "intrinsic merit" because it is 2designed
95
in formerly undemocratic nations.
In contrast to this vision, the recent Gulf War was really the
2 96
result of unilateral action, albeit cloaked in multilateralism,
and demonstrated that United Nations action is effective only
where the individual interests of the members of the Security
Council converge and they actually agree. 2 9 7 The failure of the
United States, the great power behind organizing the United

292. The means by which the United Nations has entered into the Yugoslav
conflict is designed to minimize costs on the international community in terms of
military expenses and the lives of UN troops. Unfortunately, this approach places
a greater burden on the civilians within the combat zone but appears to be the
future of UN intervention-with the exception of the Korean War, every time the
UN has intervened it has been after the fact. Durch, supra note 279, at 6-7. It
follows that the overriding concern is peace and all else comes second.
293. Ernest W. Lefever, Reigning in the U.N.: Mistaking the Instrumentfor the
Actor, 72 FOR. AFF. 17 (1993) (quoting Secretary of State Cordell Hull).
294. See icL at 18-19.
295. Id. at 19.
296. Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the Great Powers in United Nations
Peace-Keeping, 18 YALE J. INrT L. 429, 430 (1993). In this conception of the big
power model, first seen in the Korean War, "a leading power assumes the
initiative and undertakes most of the burdens of mounting a large-scale military
action, invites participation or contribution from a range of other states, and
obtains a Security Council resolution endorsing the collective effort." Under these
circumstances, the United Nations role in the entire activity, when dominated by
one power, is merely as the body that authorized the action. Id. It is important to
recognize that "[a] unanimous Security Council vote authorizing measures to deal
with a threat to or breach of the peace does not necessarily mean that these
measures are right or just" Lefever, supranote 293, at 19.
297. See Lefever, supra note 293, at 19. This political obstacle to the
effectiveness of the Security Council has not diminished with the end of the Cold
War. It cannot be emphasized enough that "[t]he political consensus among the
five permanent members of the Council obtained during the 'hot phase' of the
Gulf crisis cannot be taken as a guarantee that the paralyzing use of the veto
power is a matter of the past." Delbruck, supra note 262, at 722 (footnote
omitted). For a discussion of the veto power of the permanent members of the
Security Council and suggestions for reform, see Caron, supranote 267.
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Nations effort to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait-and the main
supporter of the Yugoslav Tribunal-to pursue criminal
prosecutions for violations of international humanitarian law after
the Gulf War illustrates the requirement of convergent national
the Security Council before it can
interests among the members of
298
act effectively in making peace.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal is one facet of the
Security Council's larger task of rebuilding the nations arising out
of the

ashes of the

SFRY. 2 99

Although

the concept

of

peacemaking is not clearly defined by the Secretary-General, 3 °°
the Tribunal is clearly a part of a larger United Nations effort to
create stability in the former Yugoslavia through the enforcement
The hope for future
of international humanitarian law.3 0 1
stability in the international community, which is secured in part
by prosecuting those individuals responsible for violating
international humanitarian law during a bloody European
conflict, is not new. 3°2 The forces that dashed those hopes in the
past are still at work today and, although much has been written
on the practical difficulties that face the Yugoslav Tribunal,
history's lessons to be learned form past failures are all too often

298.

The United States did float some trial balloons regarding prosecuting

Iraqi leaders, but did not follow through. For example, President George Bush
stated before the General Assembly that:

Iraq and its leaders must be held liable for these crimes of abuse and
destruction. But this outrageous disregard for basic human rights does
not come as a total surprise. Thousands of Iraqis have been executed on
political and religious grounds and even more through a genocidal, poison
gas war waged against Iraq's own Kurdish villagers.'
Frank C. Newman, Redressfor Gulf War Viwlations of Human Rights, 20 DEN. J.
INr' L. & POLY 213 (1992) (quoting President George Bush, The U.N.: World
Parliamentof Peace, DEPT STATE DISPATCH, Oct. 1, 1990, Current Policy No. 1303).
299.
See O'Brien, supranote 149, at 658-59 (1993).
300.
See supranote 283.
301. According to O'Brien:
The people who have been victimized by atrocities in the former Yugoslavia
...
deserve to see that justice is sought. They should be allowed to turn
their attention to building the future, not to seeking vengeance for the

past ... International humanitarian law, as reflected in the statute of the
tribunal, can deter some atrocities and mete out punishment for others.
In so doing, it can help the people of the region take forward with them
fewer burdens from this conflict than they otherwise would.
O'Brien, supranote 149, at 659.
302. See suprapart Ill.
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ignored and threaten the success of this most recent endeavor to
establish a war crimes tribunal.
Codifying international humanitarian law and ensuring that
prior war crimes tribunals provide precedents for the current
Tribunal avoids the possibility that the accused will invoke the
doctrine of nullum crimen sine lege or contest the Tribunal's
jurisdiction over them as individuals. It must be emphasized that
the Tribunal is an ad hoc subsidiary organ of the Security Council
of the United Nations, and the Security Council is ultimately
responsible for enforcing any decisions that the judges of the
Tribunal issue.
In order for the Security Council to act
successfully, all of its members must believe it is in their national
interests to act,30 3 and the members must be willing to take the
political risk of confrontation with the governments that refuse to
cooperate with the Tribunal.
The most tragic outcome of the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, regardless of the outcome of war crimes prosecutions,
would be for the international community to forget the atrocities
that occurred. 3 ° 4 If the United Nations and the rest of the
international community are serious about preventing future
gross violations of human rights, the Yugoslav Tribunal should be
viewed as a precursor to the eventual establishment of an
international criminal court,3 0 5 charged with the task of
prosecuting violations of international law, such as those that are
currently occurring in the former Yugoslavia. The SecretaryGeneral emphasized in his report on the Tribunal Statute that
"[t]he decision [to establish the Tribunal does not relate to the
establishment of an international criminal court of a permanent
nature. "3 ° 6 Nevertheless, the experience of the Yugoslav Tribunal
in overcoming the political difficulties and problems of developing
an effective criminal procedure should be used as evidence that
such a court is viable and necessary for the New World Order.

303.
O'Brien argues that "[all1 states have their self-interest at stake: viable
international humanitarian law will one day protect their own citizens, as well as
deter violations that may quickly threaten international peace and security."
O'Brien, supra note 149, at 658-59.
304. See Akhavan, supranote 6, at 283.
305. See, e.g. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for
an InternationalCourt in the New InternationalWorld Order,25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 147 (1992).
306.
Secretary-General'sReport, supranote 141, para. 12.
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POSTSCRIPT

On February 13, 1995, the Yugoslav Tribunal formally
indicted twenty-one Serbs for crimes against humanity committed
at a concentration camp in Bosnia.a3°
Of the accused, only one
individual, Dusdan Tadic, is in custody in Germany.
His
extradition from Germany to the Netherlands, where the Tribunal
sits, will not occur until spring 1995.308 The only person charged
with the crime of genocide is the camp commander, Zeljko
Meakic.3 0 9 According to a Tribunal official, the only person likely
to be tried is Mr. Tadic. 3 10 Recent attempts to obtain a peace
settlement by offering to lift the sanctions against Serbia, along
with questions about the Tribunal's budget, threaten to put a
premature end to the Tribunal.3 1 1 According to the U.S. State
Department, however, if Serbia accepts the offer to lift sanctions,
war crimes trials will not be abandoned in exchange for a
3 12
settlement.
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